



This Article examines the definition of water rights in western water law
and explores the relationship between that definition and the inefficiencies of
the current doctrinal regime, as well as the current system's inability to
accommodate increasingly valued instream uses. In doing so, the Article first
flushes out a theoretical framework for analyzing the compositional choices of
property right regimes, from usufructory to quantity-measured rights. The
compositional definition of a property right has significant implications for the
behavior of the rights, particularly in the transition between initial allocation
and efficient equilibrium of existing entitlements. The Article then applies this
framework to western water law and challenges the traditional conception of
appropriative water rights. Lastly, the Article addresses the consequences of
the usufructory nature of appropriative water rights for instream uses and
concludes that only by complete quantification can privately held instream
rights become a reality.
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Introduction
Since the early 1970s, most western states have made a concerted effort to
either maintain or augment the quantities of water flowing in their rivers and
streams. Instream uses include boating, fishing, transportation, industrial uses,
aesthetic purposes, wildlife habitat preservation, Native American subsistence,
channel maintenance, hydroelectric power, enhancement of water quality, and
groundwater recharge.' Yet, environmental interest groups, recreation
industries, and those with aesthetic or other interests in increasing the amount
of water in these natural channels have had little success in impacting instream
flows in any material way. A promising solution is the privatization of rights to
instream flows, such that private entities or individuals could purchase and
enforce instream water rights; and instream uses of water could compete in the
market for water against traditional consumptive uses. However, attempts by
states to implement privately held instream rights have thus far been
unsuccessful.
The problem of water scarcity in the West has increased dramatically over
the past few decades, mostly due to the growth of cities. The rate of growth in
many places is phenomenal. Between 1960 and 1990, domestic water use in the
western states more than doubled, from 6.5 million acre-feet to 14 million acre-
feet.2 Because new collection and storage facilities (i.e., dams and reservoirs)
are virtually impossible to construct due to environmental regulations, water
must be transferred from current uses. Though most water is currently applied
to agricultural uses, the marginal value is estimated at typically a third to a
fourth of that of municipal use. 3 Microchips, for example, are more profitable
I "A flowing stream is generally more aesthetically pleasing than a dry streambed, probably
even to the rancher who was previously diverting the water.... Flowing streams and healthy fisheries
generate tangible economic benefits through recreation, tourism, sport and commercial fishing, amenity
values, and pollution absorption." Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten
Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 444 (2004).
2 Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, I U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1, 16 (1997).
3 Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 283, 287 (2001).
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and require far less water to produce than alfalfa, but commonly the most
4valuable water rights are held by farmers who produce the lowest value crops.
A primary reason western water rights have failed to facilitate efficient
management of the resource and have been unable to accommodate private
ownership for non-consumptive uses of water is the definition of water rights
established by the early western settlers. This Article proposes that
appropriative fights as originally defined in the mid-nineteenth century are in
fact usufructory rights, resulting both in the inability of water rights to function
in markets and the difficulty of accommodating new and valuable instream
uses.
Given the complete allocation and relative scarcity of water today,
conversion of water rights to quantity-measured rights would facilitate markets,
allow for privately held instream rights, and maximize efficient management
and use.
The doctrine of prior appropriation, which in its simplest form operates as
"first in time, first in right," is complex in its history and motivated by a variety
of factors, including economic efficiency, considerations of distributive justice,
and other political forces. 5 As the story is most commonly told, the newly
conceived water rights in the West were a complete break from the eastern
system of riparianism-a new institution drawn on a blank slate, which created
definitive private property rights in water which allowed the holder to capture
and divert a specific quantity of water for a particular use. However, there are
fundamental and important similarities between eastern riparian rights and
western appropriative rights, not only in their procedural roots in the common
law, 6 but also substantively, arising from the usufructory nature of both types
of rights. Both riparian and appropriative rights are fundamentally use-
measured rights rather than quantity-measured rights; That is, the boundaries of
the right are determined by a specific use rather than a predetermined quantity.
Though particular quantities of water typically limit the boundaries of
appropriative fights, the declaration that they are rights to specific quantities of
4 Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 970 (1998). Agricultural use is also inefficient as
compared to water-based recreation. For example, agriculture composed about 90% of consumptive use
of water in Colorado and produced only $4.4 billion of the state's GDP, while recreation (a non-
consumptive use) brought in $1.3 billion from fishing and an additional $122 million from whitewater
rafting. Jason S. Wells, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Protection: The Opportunities and
Impediments to Improved Public Interest Involvement in Colorado's Instream Flow Protection Regime,
7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 309, 315-17 (2004). Even in 1985 then-govemor Richard Lamm noted that
alfalfa consumed 27% of water and produced $156 million in revenue for the state, while recreation and
tourism brought in nearly $4 billion. Id. at 320.
5 See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism:
Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLoGY L.Q. 3 (2005). Schorr provides
very convincing evidence for the claim that the driving force behind the development of appropriative
water rights in the West was not economic efficiency but considerations of distributive justice. Id.
6 Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons From the Development of Western Water Law for Emerging
Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861 (2001).
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water is misleading. The right to use actually determines the quantity of water
over which the right extends, as is true of riparian rights. In this respect,
appropriative rights are essentially use-measured rights, though supplanted by
quantity measures when the right to transfer is exercised. Use-measured rights
have inherent advantages in addressing the challenges of initial distribution of a
resource because they are statically efficient and capture the moral intuition
that an individual has no right to more than he can use. Quantity-measured
rights, on the other hand, lower transaction costs and are therefore adaptable to
changing circumstances in which shifting efficiencies of use support transfer of
rights. The existing hybrid regime includes use and quantity measures in an
attempt to incorporate the advantages of both, and to accommodate the often-
conflicting roles of the prior appropriation system in allocating and reallocating
water to various types and locations of use. Yet today, circumstances have
shifted from those faced by the creators of the western water regime; the
allocation function of western water law is now rarely applicable because most
western water has been allocated for a hundred years or more. Instead, the
vestiges of the use measure in appropriative rights merely inhibit efficient
reallocation with few offsetting advantages. Ironically, the very definition of
the boundaries of appropriative rights, which is vital for the development of
markets, is itself the biggest obstacle to desirable market-based transfers.
Hybrid rights are also antithetical to instream uses, resulting in the failure
by western states to adapt their water regimes to allow for privately held
instream rights, even where private instream rights might garner the necessary
political support. Only by throwing off the remaining ties to use measures and
turning to complete quantification can water rights take the final step to
complete definition and thereby complete commodification. 7 This final step
would allow instream uses to compete in an open market of privately held
water rights and accomplish much needed reallocation of water to uses with
higher marginal values.
8
Part I of this Article outlines a framework for describing property rights
along both a compositional and organizational spectrum, and it explains the
ways in which the composition of a right, namely measurement in either
7 Water rights will, however, remain property under a governance regime as long as states
retain ownership of water and only grant narrow usufructory rights to private entities.
8 For the price of water rights in water markets to accurately capture the opportunity cost of
water, groundwater rights would also have to be fully quantified. I do not discuss groundwater within
this paper because the law governing groundwater, though related to that of surface water, is separate
and distinct. The biggest obstacle to groundwater quantification would be integrating groundwater and
surface water rights, because water is difficult to track if flowing underground. However, these
difficulties are unlikely to be proportionately greater for groundwater than for surface water, and there
may be less political resistance to the quantification of groundwater because removal of groundwater
often already requires measurement. See, e.g., Order Approving Amended Rules Governing the
Measurement of Tributary Ground Water Diversions Located in the Arkansas River Basin (Nov. 30,
2005), available at http://water.state.co.us/pubs/rule-reg/arkrule.pdf; Rules Governing the Measurement




quantity or use, tends to affect the right's organizational characteristics. Part II
describes both riparian and appropriative water rights in these terms and
provides evidence that the two types of rights are usufructory in both
organization and composition. Part III provides a brief history of the
development of appropriative rights, relating their hybrid characteristics to the
purposes that the rights were intended to accomplish in the agrarian frontier
setting. Part IV specifically addresses instream water rights, providing an
account of the various efforts by states to protect instream flows and the
characteristics of these rights that prevent their incorporation into the current
water law regime. Lastly, this Article presents a proposal for full quantification
of water rights as a solution to many of the obstacles faced by instream rights.
I. Property Regimes: Organization and Composition
Water rights are often considered an "advanced" form of property rights
because of their usufructory characteristics. 9 The communal nature of water
and its fundamental necessity for life are two likely reasons for the unique form
of the rights that allocate management and use of the resource. Grants of rights
by single uses rather than large bundles under exclusionary regimes enhance
efficiency and promote maximum utilization. Fundamental choices in how
society defines property rights influence the resource's efficient allocation and
reallocation, the efficiency of the bundles in which rights to the resource are
packaged, and whether primary decisionmakers regarding use of the resource
are individuals, communities, or larger governmental entities.
In the following Sections, I analyze property rights as having two primary
types of characteristics: those describing their organization and those
describing their composition.' 0 Both the organizational and compositional
aspects of property rights can be charted on a spectrum. Organization varies on
a range from exclusion to governance, and composition varies from quantity to
usufructory measurement. Property rights can also be compositionally hybrid-
they are subject to both quantity and usufructory measurement. These hybrid
rights behave in unique ways and therefore can be a particularly efficient or
inefficient choice of property regime depending on the circumstances.
A. The Organization of Property Rights
The organizational aspect of a property right refers to the bundle of rights
that make up the property right itself and circumscribe or limit acceptable uses
for the underlying resource. As previously mentioned, the size and specificity
9 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1529, 1530 (1989).
10 This form of analysis is adopted from the article by Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
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of this bundle of rights can fall anywhere on- a spectrum from exclusion to
governance.
An exclusionary regime grants the right-holder a general right to exclude
and thereby provides a "protected zone, [in which] owners have open-ended
choices of how to invest in or consume the asset"" -by selecting among the
many possible uses of the underlying resource. The traditional real property
bundle of rights often attributed to Blackstone is the classic example of an
exclusionary regime at its maximum. Ownership includes an absolute right to
exclude, absolute privilege to use or abuse the land, and an absolute power to
transfer the whole. Exclusionary regimes are supported by the "right to a thing"
view of property-that property "appropriate[s] to individuals not the
immediate use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used."' 
2
A governance regime, on the other hand, describes much more
specifically those rights that the property owner may exercise on a use-by-use
basis. Governance is one means to encourage maximum utilization of a
resource. Usufructory rights are rights measured in, or restricted to, single uses,
and such rights are one example of a governance regime. Historically,
usufructory rights consisted of very specifically defined land use rights that
were not transferable and that terminated upon the death of the owner. The
rights also terminated and reverted to the common pool upon non-use. In other
words, the right to non-use was not included in the bundle granted to the right-
holder. A modem example of this type of usufructory right is the exercise of
temporary dominion over public basketball courts; the right to occupy the court
is returned to the common pool upon the basketball game's completion.
13
Another example is the Maori system of usufructory property rights; property
rights were allocated to "individuals and families on a functional rather than a
geographical basis."1 4 The Maori rights also reverted to the tribe after a period
of non-use, and could then be allocated to another tribe member. 15
Almost all property rights fall somewhere between the extremes of full
exclusion and complete governance. 16 Even real property is regulated with
11 Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).
12 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *4. See also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-65 (1993).
13 See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 1366.
14 The Maori are the native New Zealand population. Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One
Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 321
(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). "[A] person would not own a zone of space; he would
instead own the right to use a particular resource in a particular way." Id. at 324.
15 Id. at 325.
16 The dichotomy of exclusion versus governance may be somewhat false when in fact most
property rights are exceptions to these two categories. See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or,
Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-04 (1998). "Blackstone himself was thoroughly aware of
these pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion." Id. at 603. However, it is useful to




respect to acceptable uses and the right to exclude.' 7 Usufructory type rights
often allow for transfer or the exercise of some discretion by the right-holder to
select among various uses of the resource. Where a property right falls on the
spectrum of exclusion to governance influences the behavior of the right: the
degree of governmental control, the possibility of participation in markets, the
potential for creative solutions to resource allocation problems through
contractual or extra-legal means, and so forth.
B. The Composition of Property Rights
The composition of a property right refers to that unit to which a certain
bundle of rights attaches-that is, the unit in which the right is measured. The
compositional aspect of property rights includes a range of possibilities. The
most common and obvious way to measure property rights is in distinct
quantities.18 Quantification can be made in acres, feet, bushels, pounds, etc.
Quantities can also be limited in various dimensions: vertically, horizontally,
and temporally. 19 The units chosen to measure the resource can fall on a
spectrum of more or less accurate proxies for measuring the valued
characteristic of the object and will tend to vary depending on the cost of
measurement. 20 Quantity is often the basis for exclusionary regimes, because it
is a means to delineate a boundary over which the right to exclude extends
without specifying each of the rights and liberties included by that boundary.
2'
Though not the only option for measuring property rights, quantity measures• 22
are the most common and typically the most efficient.
Another compositional possibility is to measure property in uses, such that
the quantities of the underlying resource may fluctuate with respect to the rights
granted. The use for which the right is granted determines the extent of the
right-that is, how much of the underlying resource may be appropriated. A
familiar example is that of certain types of easements. If I have a right to build
17 For example, land use is limited by the doctrine of nuisance and the doctrine of reciprocal
easements of support. The right to exclude may also be limited depending on the use to which property
is put, such as the regulation of common carriers.
18 I am distinguishing between defining resources and defining or measuring property rights
in them. For most property rights, "resource" is the physical object(s) to which the rights refer.
However, the same concept can sensibly be extended by analogy to intangibles. For example, the
resource that is the subject of patent rights is an invention or idea. A use taken alone is not a resource, as
I use the term, but must be associated with some other resource (either tangible or intangible).
19 For example, real estate may be divided into surface estates and mineral estates. Flyover
rights are also typically separate from ownership of the surface. Leases are an example of property that
is limited in time.
20 See Smith, supra note 10, at 467-74.
21 The efficiency advantages of quantity measures of property rights are similar to the
efficiency advantages of the firm over numerous individual contracts, insofar as transaction costs render
control over a fixed bundle of rights preferable to negotiating each individual right.
22 1 am referring to an Anderson and Hill analysis of types of property definitions that
compare the cost of different forms of measurement versus the benefits of more definitive property
boundaries. Anderson & Hill, supra note 5.
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a driveway across your land to access a road, there is no fixed quantity of land
on which I have the right to build a driveway. Instead, I have the right to build
on as much land as is necessary to gain access to the road. If circumstances
should change such that I must use more of your land for the driveway to
achieve the same end, then I may do so. Nothing has changed about my right, it
has not grown, the bundle of rights associated with it remain the same, yet I am
utilizing more of the object resource than before. Another example might be the
right to divert and use enough water to irrigate thirty acres of alfalfa; the
quantity described by the right will vary depending on the weather.
As there is a spectrum between exclusion and governance regimes, there
is a like spectrum between quantity and usufructory-composed rights. The
composition of property rights may be use-based with quantity limitations, or
quantity-measured with organizational use restrictions. The same right can be
described in different ways depending on one's choice of denominator. For
example, if I want to purchase a right that will allow me to graze cattle on your
land, there are several options. One possibility is to measure the right in blades
of grass, such that I would have to determine how many blades of grass are
necessary to feed the number of cattle that I have and buy exactly that amount
from you. This is a strictly quantity-measured right-if I am wrong about the
amount of grass my cattle need, my cattle might starve. Or I might purchase the
right to graze my cattle on your land, such that I have the right to consume as
much grass as is necessary for my cattle to survive and maybe even to get fat,
depending on the terms of the deal. My right could be described as measured in
use-because the amount of grass consumed by my cattle may vary without
overstepping the bounds of my right-but with the quantity limitation that my
use only extends so far as the boundaries of your land (let's say thirty acres). I
only have the right to as much grass to feed my cattle as can be found on your
thirty acres, and no more. On the other hand, this same right could be described
as quantity-composed with usufructory organizational limitations. I have a right
to consume the grass on your thirty acres, but regulated by the rule that I can
only use the thirty acres of grass to raise my cattle, and if not used to raise my
cattle, I may forfeit my right over the unused grass. This is where the spectrums
of use- and quantity-composed rights meet. These mixed rights are easily
treated ambiguously because it is unclear whether use or quantity defines the
fundamental boundaries of the property right.
But the ambiguity problem is more pervasive than merely when use- and
quantity-composed rights meet on the spectrum. Use- and quantity-composed
rights can also appear ambiguous in their purest forms. For example, a license
to watch a dramatic performance in a Roman theatre will include a right to
exclude others from a seat and grant the licensee the liberty of occupying the
Vol. 24:2, 2007
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seat herself.23 The license might be considered a sort of short-term property
right over the seat. The right can either be described in quantity terms-the
right to a standardized quantity accepted as the size of one seat on the bench; or
it can be described in use terms-the right to enough space as is necessary to
watch the performance in a seated position. One test to determine whether the
right is measured in use rather than quantity, such that the right to occupy a seat
is derivative from the right to watch the performance, is to ask what happens in
the case of the extra-large or the extra-small Roman. If the short-term property
right in the seat that arises out of the right to comfortably watch the
performance is truly measured by use, then the extra-large Roman may occupy
two seats.24 And the extra-small Roman who only needs half the space to
comfortably watch the performance does not have the right to rent out the
excess to the extra-large Roman next to her, if her right to the seat is purely
usufructory. The extra-small Roman has no right to any space that she cannot,
or does not, use for the purpose of viewing the theatrical performance. Thus,
not only can she not transfer it to someone else, she cannot use it to put down
her bookbag, or any other use that is not ancillary to viewing the performance.
Unused space is forfeited to the common pool.
In normal contexts, with average-sized Romans, there is typically no need
to determine what measure is at the compositional essence of these ambiguous
property rights. Measuring the property right in a theatre seat in quantity or use
will almost always produce the same result, namely, the right to occupy the
area normally required for a person to sit. The same situation arises with
respect to western appropriative water rights. Whether a traditional
appropriative water right is a right to irrigate thirty acres, or a right to the
quantity of water typically required to irrigate thirty acres, is not immediately
apparent. Again, under normal conditions, the relationship between use and the
quantity of water necessary for that use will remain constant and therefore does
not require a determination of the underlying measure of the right.
Furthermore, most water rights are now adjudicated, which means that there are
strict limitations on the quantity of water that may be diverted. The result might
be a use right with a quantity limitation; or a quantity-based right under a
usufructory governance regime. But the compositional regime underlying a
right is not merely a matter of convenience or convention, particularly when
positing how a property regime is expected to function. There are far-reaching
consequences for the behavior of the right depending on whether it is
fundamentally use- or quantity-measured.
23 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELL[ AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925)
(1625) (quoting MARCUS TULLY CICERO, DE FINIBUS, Iil.xx.67, n.d.). I use the Roman theatre example
because of the continuous benches, such that individual "seats" are not clearly defined.
24 This precise issue has some resonance today with airline travel, though airline policy does
not treat airline tickets as usufructory rights. See Brief of Respondent at 1, Luther v. Southwest Airlines,
No. B147939 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2001) (holding that an airline may have a policy requiring "a
passenger, at the time of check-in, to purchase a second seat if it appears that she cannot be safely and
comfortably accommodated in one seat").
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C. The Significance of Measurement
The choice between quantity and use as the measure of a property right
directly affects: (1) the default bundle of rights granted by the property right;
(2) the homogeneity of the rights; and (3) the possibilities for division and
recombination of the rights into more or less efficiently sized bundles.
A quantity-defined right tends toward a more exclusionary regime
because quantities are only physical limitations on the extent of rights and do
not address any limitation in use. Quantity-defined rights certainly can be, and
usually are, regulated in ways that limit the owner's choices over use. In fact,
quantity-measured rights often serve as the base upon which to apply a
governance regime. However, the default state of the right allows the owner to
use the resource in any way he or she chooses. That is, where the law remains
silent, the right is with the owner and not with the common pool from which
the right was carved.
A usufructory-defined right, on the other hand, will almost by definition
result in a governance regime, because a right that is defined by a single use
usually leaves very little choice by the owner as to how to apply the resource.
However, the use in which the right is measured may encompass a number of
included uses, creating a quasi-exclusionary zone in which the owner is free to
choose. For example, one might have the right to enough water to irrigate thirty
acres, leaving the owner to decide which crops shall be grown, which in turn
affects how much water is necessary for the owner's use. But typically,
usufructory-defined rights reserve the majority of rights to the commons, often
controlled by the state, or the holder of the larger estate from which the right
was carved. Resources that are considered to rightfully belong at least in part to
the public seem best to fit in usufructory regimes. The choice between quantity
and use to measure a right often brings up normative and empirical questions as
to who is the best candidate to manage a resource: private individuals, a group
of private individuals that share control of the resource, or the state.
Quantified property rights tend to be more homogeneous, and thereby
more likely candidates for participation in markets. 25 Usufructory rights are
often unique because they are imbedded in the context of the particular use for
which the right was granted, tying them to the physical, geographic, and
temporal characteristics of the use itself.26  This context-dependent
heterogeneity facilitates a complex web of interlocking rights in which rights
may be overlayed onto existing rights and overlayed again. The result can be a
highly efficient system of maximum utilization in which owners' use rights fit
together like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle that leave no room for waste or non-use.
25 "[R]ights that are based on exclusion are more easily transferable than those that are based
more on use." Smith, supra note 10, at 469 n.52.
26 On the other hand, parcels of land are an example of a quantified property right that often
has unique characteristics, resulting in some market friction.
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The problem is that if the relative value of uses changes, reallocation without
harm to third parties is nearly impossible. Changing a single use will almost
inevitably infringe upon another's right and send a ripple effect throughout the
web of interdependent rights and uses.
With quantified rights, the boundaries of the right are both theoretically
distinguishable and less costly to determine, which in turn facilitates transfer.
27
The transaction costs from determining exactly what rights the buyer is
purchasing are lowered, as is the risk that the buyer may be mistaken regarding
the content of his purchase. 28 Homogeneous rights are much easier to value,
both because there are other similar rights with which to compare prices and
because the buyer has better information.
Lastly, quantified rights produce greater flexibility by allowing intentional
division and recombination of rights. Reshuffling of the bundles of rights is
possible because the boundaries of the underlying resource and associated
rights and duties are more easily determined and tend to be more exclusionary
in nature. Though the self-adjusting nature of usufructory rights may reallocate
rights as a result of forfeiture, this reshuffling is not contracted for by the
parties and therefore is less likely to track mutual gains. Quantified rights can
be divided into a number of smaller units-two half-acres instead of an acre,
four quarter-pounds instead of a pound-as well as divided across time, such as
leases or seasonal use of land.29 Another way to divide quantified rights is to
break down an exclusionary right into a number of usufructory rights. These
rights are compositionally usufructory but limited by the original quantity of
the underlying asset. The division of property into particular uses allows for
creative solutions to allocation problems through contracts for individual uses,
restrictive covenants, or similar arrangements.
The downside of such numerous possibilities is the problem of
fragmentation. Rights are more easily broken apart than reassembled because
of the ratchet effect of transaction costs, so that property rights tend to be found
in smaller units than is most efficient. 30 Use-defined rights avoid this problem
27 Definite boundaries encourage transfers by promoting four characteristics necessary to
convert common property to individual property rights, which in turn induce market allocation. These
four characteristics are:
(1) maximum exclusivity within the constraint of the physical nature of the resource; (2) free
transfer at costs which are low relative to the value of the resource; (3) absence of positive and
negative externalities that prevent transfer or impose excessive, unaccounted for costs on third
parties; and (4) a clear, general definition of permitted and prohibited activities.
Hobbs, supra note 2, at 24-25.
28 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-38 (2000).
29 See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of
Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 190-220 (2004)
(discussing horizontal, vertical, functional, and temporal severance of property).
30 The effect is that of a "ratchet" because market forces drive the break-down of property
rights into smaller units, but transaction costs prevent their reassembly even if reassembly would be
efficient. Therefore the sizes of property rights ratchet down over time. See Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999) [hereinafter Heller, Boundaries of Private
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because they are very difficult to break down, in part because use rights cannot
be broken into pieces that have no use-by definition, use rights are of a size
that are useful. Secondly, use rights tend to overlap in such a way that any
change in use will be likely to infringe on others' rights, so that transfers are
discouraged. For example, if the extra-small Roman wants to sell some of her
seat to one of her extra-large neighbors, she may not be able to do so under a
usufructory regime if the Roman sitting behind her is using the space as a foot
rest. The extra-small Roman would likely lose any right to that space because
she was not using it herself and another individual had appropriated it. The self-
adjusting character of usufructory rights has thwarted our extra-small Roman's
attempt at more efficient bundling. However, usufructory regimes like that of
seating in a Roman theatre avoid the problem of fragmentation and limit
externalities that would otherwise produce third-party harm. The static
character of use-right networks is not necessarily inefficient; the desirability of
such a regime depends on the nature of the underlying resource and the values
of its various uses.
II. The Property Right in Water Rights
With the framework of the organizational and compositional aspects of
property rights in place, we can analyze how water rights fit into the matrix.
Eastern riparian rights are a paradigm of usufructory rights, both with respect to
organization and composition. Appropriative rights on the other hand are
commonly treated as if they were exclusionary, but I challenge this
classification and instead suggest that appropriative rights are also part of a
usufructory governance regime.
A riparian right is a right to a particular use of water on a particular
watercourse with the restriction that the use may not unreasonably deplete the
supply available for legitimate use by others.3 1 Every right is subject to an
organizational reasonableness standard so that each right is limited insofar as
others in the same watershed have valid claims to the same physical resource.
The riparian right to use is further restricted by the rule of appurtenance, which
requires that the water be put to use only on parcels of land adjacent to the
watercourse. As specific use rights, riparian rights do not involve a general
right to exclude other than the extent necessary to protect the use that makes up
the substance of the right.
The composition of riparian rights is use-based as well. The right is not to
a fixed quantity of water, but to the amount necessary for a particular approved
use. A riparian right can be highly variable in quantity, "expanding and
contracting with the number of users and with the varying flow of the
Property]; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
31 For an example of riparian rights, see Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888).
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stream." 32 The doctrine of reasonableness is the ultimate limitation on the
amount of water over which the right may extend, rather than any
predetermined quantity of water. Riparian rights display the characteristics that
one would expect of a use-composed right, because they consist of single or
very limited bundles of rights. The rights are specific to a particular location
and are appurtenant to the land. The heterogeneity makes them unsuitable for
markets, and almost impossible to unbundle or reassemble into more efficient
parcels. Far from typical private property, they are more like shares in a limited
common property regime.
33
Western water rights are assumed to be a complete commodification and
privitization of water, and thus are often classified on the opposite extreme
from riparianism, based partly on the belief that they are measured entirely in
quantities and not uses. Admittedly, appropriative rights are somewhat more
akin to real property than are riparian rights, allowing for a wider scope of
authority over the resource by the right-holder. Yet, an accurate description of
appropriative rights requires a much more nuanced examination of the nature of
the right. In truth, western water rights are just a few steps away from the full-
fledged usufructory rights that make up the riparian regime, and though the
rights are measured in quantity in some respects, the core measure is in fact
usufructory.
34
As are riparian rights, appropriative rights are severely limited with
respect to use. 35 The doctrines of waste, forfeiture, and public trust preclude
any possibility of the exercise of absolute dominion by the right-holder.
36
There is also no right to non-use; 37 water that is not diverted is not removed
from the common pool and therefore may be used by the next in priority. If the
non-use continues for a certain statutory period, typically between five to ten
32 ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 60 (1983).
33 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 179 (1998).
34 "Water rights became more of a general water entitlement to use water rather than a right to
a specific quantity .. " A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 769, 771 (2001).
35 A water right may only be applied to the land for use on which the water was originally
appropriated, unless a change of use has been approved by the water courts or agency. Enlarged
Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 210 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1949). The same is true
for changes in type of use, such as conversion from use in powering a mill to irrigation. Wash. State
Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 147 P. 1073 (Idaho 1915).
36 The doctrine of waste prohibits the use of water for non-beneficial activities as defined by
statute or common law. The doctrine of forfeiture holds that water left instream, and therefore unused
for a certain statutory period, is forfeited and reverts to the common pool for appropriation. See
Neuman, supra note 4, at 963. The public trust doctrine recognizes that the public has vested rights in
some uses and bodies of water, for example for fishing or navigation, and a right-holder may not use his
right in such a way as to interfere with the right of the public. GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L.
GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 526-28 (6th ed. 2000). All of these doctrines restrict
the ways in which a right-holder may put water to use and thereby circumscribe the authority granted by
the property right.
37 Janet C. Neuman & Keith Hirokawa, How Good Is an Old Water Right? The Application of
Statutory Forfeiture Provisions to Pre-Code Water Rights, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 24 (2000).
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years, then the priority of the right is permanently forfeited with respect to that
amount.
Evidence of the usufructory nature of these rights is also apparent from
the rhetoric that surrounds early court descriptions of the right; "the
appropriator does not own the corpus of the water, only its use," 38 and the
owner has the "right only to have the flow and use." 39 The law of most western
states includes a declaration that ownership of the water belongs to the people
of the state.4 ° The justifying intuition is that water ought not to be entirely
controlled by private individuals because of the power this would imply over
others who necessarily rely on this essential resource, particularly in the more
arid states. Governmental entities have also been particularly active in the West
in building water infrastructures, giving the government a sort of Lockean
justification for retaining some rights in the water captured and transported by
its system. The end result is that water rights granted to private persons are very
limited, often to a single use; if rights in property are sticks in a bundle, then
water rights are handed out one stick at a time.
The common belief that appropriative rights are entirely quantity
measured arises from the quantity caps included in water decrees and the
quantity measures that appear in court cases regarding transfers and changes of
use.4 1 In fact, these quantities are secondary to the use, which remains the
primary standard of measure, and are determined by the use for which the right
is decreed. Instead of a reasonableness limitation on the use-measured right as
in the riparian system, limitations on appropriative rights are made through the
mechanism of priority, "first in time, first in right," and quantity caps. These
rights are temporarily quantified only for the purposes of change in point of
diversion or use, so that transfers are possible.
Western water rights combine the advantages of both a usufructory and a
quantified system to produce a hybrid regime capable of handling the allocation
and reallocation of this very difficult-to-measure resource. The confusion as to
the fundamental characteristics of appropriative water rights is therefore
unsurprising in light of the bifurcated property regime that includes both use
and quantity measures. The older water law regimes in the western states
seemed to treat use and quantity as if they were, for the most part, constant with
respect to one another. Upon codification, many states adopted a presumption
that the right to irrigate one acre was functionally equivalent to a right to a
38 Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont. 1933).
39 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 289 (3d ed. 1911) (emphasis
added).
40 The Colorado Constitution of 1876 states that "[t]he water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. See also Schorr, supra note 5, at 10; Frank J. Trelease,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 639 (1957).
41 See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo.
1999); Farmers High Line Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1999).
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particular quantity of water (in Montana, the legislature set the amount at one
miner's inch per acre 42). Therefore, whether use or actual quantity was the
essence of the right was irrelevant to the shape of the property right, because
one measure was identical to the other. However, this use-to-quantity formula
breaks down when rights are transferred or new uses are introduced, resulting
in the stagnation of water markets.
III. Prior Appropriation: A Hybrid System of Rights
This Part of the Article further challenges the traditional notion of
appropriative rights as exclusionary rights, and provides additional evidence
that appropriative rights are actually a type of usufructory regime that is
compositionally hybrid. First, I summarize the history of the rise and
establishment of prior appropriation in the West. Next, I highlight the
usufructory features of the common law and statutory doctrine of western water
law. I then distinguish the limited role of quantity measures in water rights, and
describe how the hybrid nature of water rights affects how they function in
initial allocations, transfers (by which I mean markets generally), and
adaptation to new uses.
A. The Rise of Prior Appropriation
The system of water law based on the doctrine of prior appropriation was
adopted by states west of the hundredth meridian to meet the particular needs
of the western settlers. Settlers were enticed to the arid lands of the West by the
promise of land-land that was virtually worthless without water for irrigation.
In Left Hand Ditch, the Colorado Supreme Court described the formidable
landscape: "The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive .... [A]rtificial irrigation for agriculture is an
absolute necessity .... 43
The existing American system of water rights in the East was unsuitable
to the Westerners for several reasons.44 It failed to provide a satisfactory
guarantee that there would be enough water for miners or farming families to
survive, riparianism requires that each right-holder forfeit some water in
periods of scarcity. Under such a system, all the crops in a community could
fail from insufficient water-a highly undesirable result. Better that some
irrigators are satisfied though some receive no water at all, and priority is an
42 See Conrow v. Huffine, 138 P. 1094 (Mont. 1914). The presumption was rebuttable upon
proof that more water was necessary to irrigate, for example due to particular soil conditions or a type of
crop that required more water.
43 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (Colo. 1882). The Court echoed this
observation fifty years later in People v. Letford: "[T]he economic and industrial development of an arid
state is directly dependent on its water supply." 79 P.2d 274, 281 (Colo. 1938).
44 "If [riparianism] had been recognized and applied in this territory it would still be a desert."
Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290, 291 (Utah 1891).
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objective means to select the privileged right-holders.45 Furthermore, the
system must be able to accommodate the storage of water as a means to buffer
against future drought. Because these miners and settlers were strangers to one
another, the determinative system of water allocation that they developed did
not rely on social norms of cooperation. 46 "First in time, first in right" provides
a definitive, objective framework and ensures that early settlers will not be
displaced by later comers. The arid landscape also made a limit of water rights
to riparian owners inappropriate. There are many fewer water courses in the
West, particularly in the Front Range area, and to limit water access to those
owning land adjacent to the river would be to condemn the non-adjacent
parcels as useless.
. Prior appropriation responds to the shortcomings of riparianism and
reflects several fundamental principles: (1) maximum utilization of water
resources, because water is necessary for settlement and progress;47 (2)
prevention of speculation as a non-welfare producing, wasteful activity; 48 (3)
prevention of monopolistic control over water resources and protection of the
small farmer; 49 and (4) recognition that water is fundamentally public in
character, belonging to the citizens of the state. Prior appropriation was
generally accepted throughout the West by 1860 and was recognized by the
U.S. Congress as the relevant water law in 1866.50 Ultimately, nine states
adopted prior appropriation as the sole water regime: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and
nine others utilize prior appropriation concurrent with riparianism.
5 1
45 Gilcrest v. Bowen, 24 P.2d 141 (Mont. 1933) (stating that law and equity give first
claimant of water sufficient quantity of water to irrigate his land). As stated by Frank Trelease, "[T]he
rule of priority does guarantee a firm supply to all for whom the source is sufficient, and the senior
irrigators can build a stable agriculture unmatched in humid climes." Frank J. Trelease, Climate Change
and Water Law, in CLIMATE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER SUPPLY 702 (J. Wallis ed., 1977).
46 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).
47 See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 986 (Colo. 1968).
48 "The General Assembly and the courts of this state have often reinforced the policy of
keeping the public water resource available to those who can and will use it beneficially, as opposed to
those who wish to speculate in its value and price." Chatfield East Well Co. v. Chatfield East Property
Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Colo. 1998). A modem example of water speculation is the
Spencer-Rocky Ford Ditch grab, in which a speculator bought a sugar refinery in Colorado, including
water rights to irrigate 4,000 adjoining acres, and sold it six years later to the city of Aurora for a $9
million profit. Bruce Barcott, There's an Old Saying in Colorado: You Can Steal My Wife, But Not My
Water, LEGAL AFF., Aug. 2004, at 50. On the other hand, speculators may in some circumstances serve a
useful economic function. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54 (5th ed. 1998).
49 See Schorr, supra note 5, at 3 (claiming that "the appropriation doctrine actually was
intended to express contemporary radical, agrarian ideals of broadly distributed property and
antimonopolism").
50 14 Stat. 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (2000)).
51 COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., DECADES DOWN THE ROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF
INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 7 tbl. 1 (2005).
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B. The Usufructory Measure of Water Rights
The composition of western water rights arose from the functions that
prior appropriation was intended to serve: allocation and reallocation of water
within the framework of the fundamental principles listed above. The outcome
was a hybrid composition including both use and quantity measures, though the
use measure of western water rights has been obscured by the commonly
accepted description of these rights. Recognition of the use measure in water
rights explains why even appropriative water rights have not resulted in
successful water markets, and why fundamental changes are necessary to fully
incorporate privately held instream rights into the existing regime.
The water law of the western states has codified three limitations on the
amount of a water right: (1) the size of the original claim; (2) the capacity of
the ditch or other diversionary mechanism; and (3) the amount of water put to
beneficial use. The smallest of these three measures is the maximum measure
of the right. Through the appropriation process, use actually defines the limit of
the right in all three respects. The specific quantity caps such as cubic feet per
second or other convenient measures serve merely as a proxy for use in
defining the boundaries of the right to make those boundaries more distinct.
Yet, quantity proxies are only imposed where use has first established the
extent of the right.
The first step in acquiring a water right is to provide notice of intent to
appropriate. Under contemporary water statutes in every state except Colorado,
this step requires a permit for the particular use to which the water is to be
applied.52 The permit usually includes quantity limitations based on the
declared use, often derived from statutory or administrative "water duties"
53
that define the total amount of water that may be applied per acre without
waste. 54 The permit description of the water right is, in effect, an ex ante
quantity limitation on the size of the right. These limitations arise directly from
the stated purpose of the appropriation, and merely circumscribe the amount of
water that may be used for that purpose without violating statutory restrictions
against waste or intrusion upon others' rights. The quantities stated in the
permit are not definitive descriptions of the boundaries of the right itself,
because the right has not yet vested. In early permit issues, "applicants for
water right decrees typically based their claims on a rate of water diversion
based on their own testimony as to the size of their facilities and the number of
52 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.130, 537.990 (2003).
53 Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083 (Or. 1909) (defining "duty of water" as the quantity essential
to the irrigation of any given tract).
54 The appropriation of water for a specific purpose, and a decree adjudicating the right to
such appropriation, not only limits the use to the amount appropriated, but also to the quantity necessary
for the purpose for which it is appropriated. See Colo. Milling & Elevator Co. v. Larimer & Weld
Irrigation Co., 56 P. 185, 186 (Colo. 1899); Conrow v. Huffine, 138 P. 1094 (Mont. 1914). See also
Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irrigating Co. v. Poudre Val. Reservoir Co., 129 P. 248 (Colo. App. 1912)
(finding that an irrigator cannot take more water than is reasonably necessary to irrigate land).
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acres to be irrigated.",55 This lax approach was not mere laziness on the part of
the courts or water bureaus-there was simply no need to strictly limit initial
appropriations. Only the amount of water that was actually put to a beneficial
use would vest into a valid right.
The second step in appropriation is to construct a ditch with a headgate or
other means of diversion. Most western states require physical diversion of
water for a valid appropriation, 56 even for non-consumptive uses such as mills.
A modem statutory definition of diversion is to "remov[e] water from its
natural course or location, or control[] water in its natural course or location, by
means of a ditch, canal, flume, reservoir, bypass, pipeline, conduit, well, pump,
or other structure or device." 57 As such, diversion serves three essential
purposes: capture, notice, and measurement.
As is true of other fugitive resources, such as oil and gas or wild animals,
water is difficult to catch. Therefore, capture and exercise of control are
commonly required to rightfully declare a portion of these fugitive resources
removed from the common pool and privately owned.58 By removing water
from its natural course, others are also alerted that the water is claimed for use.
Before statutory measurement requirements, measurement of exactly how
much water was removed by a diversion was not necessary for notice purposes.
The effects would be apparent to others by investigating the amount left
instream. If the senior right-holding farmer downstream did not receive
sufficient water for his crops at his headgate, then the more junior diverters
upstream were wrongfully diverting water not available for use. A
determination of the precise amount of water in question was unnecessary.
The diversion structure and the capacity of the ditch are also rough
measurements of the quantity of water being removed from the stream. A
vested water right cannot possibly be greater than the capacity of the ditch
because a right-holder cannot put more water to beneficial use than is
diverted. 59 Furthermore, the capacity of a ditch is likely to be a good proxy for
how much water the right-holder expects to put to beneficial use, because there
is little incentive to invest in a ditch with greater capacity than is useful.
Therefore, though the capacity of the ditch is a second quantity limitation on
the water right, it too is derivable from the use measure.
55 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the Water
Appropriation System, 83 NEB. L. REV. 485, 488 n.10 (2004).
56 Nev. Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 45 P. 472,480 (Or. 1896); Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs,
26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891) (stating that water running in its natural channel is the property of the
public).
57 COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103 (7) (2006).
58 See MacDonnell, supra note 55. Appropriation as a rule of capture rewards personal effort
and therefore fits well with the individualism of the West as well as the Lockean notion of labor as the
justification for property rights.
59 This is true even for non-consumptive uses such as mills, since diversion is required.
Vol. 24:2, 2007
Instream Water Rights
The final requirement for a water right to vest is to put the amount of
water claimed to beneficial use. The doctrine of beneficial use applies both
compositionally and organizationally to limit both the specific activities to
which water may be put and the measure of the right. Beneficial use not only
measures the amount of the initial appropriation, but also the ongoing
maintenance of the boundaries of the right. Beneficial use is "the basis, the
measure, and the limit" of the water right.6' In the process of appropriation,
neither the initial decree nor the capacity of the ditch has the final force in
determining the measure of the right; rather, the amount of water that is put to
62beneficial use determines the measure of this right. There is no right to rent or
sell "excess" water included in the water decree, since that amount has not
63vested. Not all of the water listed in the initial decree must be put to use
immediately to ultimately be included in the right with the same priority as the
earliest of the appropriations. If the initial decree includes enough water to
irrigate acreage that has not yet been developed, the right-holder must exercise
reasonable diligence to put the water to use. In the meantime, the water left
instream by the right-holder may be used by others. Once the recipient of the
decree has developed the capacity to put the water to beneficial use and has in
fact done so, then the right will vest for the full decreed amount.
60 "All water rights are subject to beneficial use as the measure of the right." Farmers High
Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 200(Colo. 1999) (quoting In re
Application for Water Rights of Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 438 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1997)).
Colorado defines beneficial use as "the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the
appropriation is lawfully made." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2006). Texas defines beneficial use
as "the amount of water which is economically necessary for a purpose authorized by this chapter, when
reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in applying the water to that purpose." TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 11.002(4) (Vernon 1988). The uses to which water may be put that qualify as
beneficial are often treated by the courts as interchangeable between states. The Ninth Circuit went so
far as to state that "beneficial use" was a matter of general law among the western states. United States
v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We do not deny or overlook the
differences in water law among the various western states. However, on the point of what is beneficial
use the law is 'general and without significant dissent."') (citing 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 19.2
(R. Clark ed., 1967)).
61 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (2003); N.M. CONST. art. XVI § 3. See also Farmers High Line
Canal & Reservoir Co., supra note 60, at 200 ("All water rights are subject to beneficial use as the
measure of the right.").
62 "[T]he fundamental purpose of a change proceeding is to ensure that the true right-that
which has ripened by beneficial use over time--is the one that will prevail in its changed form." Santa
Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55 (Colo. 1999). "An implied limitation
is read into every decree adjudicating a water right that diversions are limited to an amount sufficient for
the purpose for which the appropriation was made, even though such limitation may be less than the
decreed rate of diversion." Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 1981).
See also Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irrigating Co. v. Poudre Val. Reservoir Co., 129 P. 248 (Colo.
App. 1912).
63 See COL. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-103(5), 302(l)(a), 305(3) (1997); Orr v. Arapahoe Water
and Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988) (finding that a senior appropriator may not lend, rent,
or sell any excess water); Galiger v. McNulty, 260 P. 401 (Mont. 1927). Only recently have some states
adopted "conserved water statutes," which authorize water users to retain and use water conserved by
water saving techniques. Neuman, supra note 4, at 956.
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In early appropriations, water rights were sometimes measured only in
terms of the use to which the water was to be put. Contractual provisions
entitling members or customers of a ditch company to their share of water
might be entirely use-measured, for example "the right and privilege... to take
from said Irrigating Ditch No. 10... a sufficient quantity of water to irrigate
eighty acres of land and no more." 64 This type of usufructory definition allows
flexibility in the particular amount of water over which the right extends." The
lack of quantity specificity is not imprecision in the measure of the right; it is
inherent to a genuinely use-measured right. Even today, eighty to ninety
percent of the consumptive use of water in the West is for irrigation, 66 which is
a well known standard use that easily translates into approximate quantities of
consumption. When the types of uses for water are limited to a few that are
well known and understood, employing use as a proxy for quantity is low-cost.
There is no need to quantify at all, even for determining right infringement or
transfer. The right to irrigate x number of acres is a sufficiently specific
measure for the property regime to function well enough. However, problems
arise when the density of rights in a watershed reach a threshold beyond which
changes in use affect other right-holders.
C. The Quantity Measure of Water Rights
Quantity measures play two roles in the prior appropriation system. They
set limits on otherwise use-measured rights and are temporarily authoritative
for the purposes of transfer and change in use. In recent years, increasing
numbers of quantity limitations have been imposed on western water rights. As
the amount of unallocated water decreases, rights become more and more
interlocking, such that any change in use is likely to have third party effects. To
avoid negative externalities, legislators and judges impose more stringent
quantity limitations. These quantity limitations tend to freeze existing patterns
of use and prevent changes or increases in diversion that might harm other
right-holders. This development in the definition of rights goes hand in hand
with improvements in technology that make such measurements both possible
and economical. Water rights can and are limited with respect to flow, timing,
and total volume. 6 7 Courts commonly impose seasonal limitations on the times
of year that water may be diverted, particularly when the use is agricultural; a
64 East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 972
(Colo. 2005); see also Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 29 P. 906, 906-07 (Colo. App. 1892).
65 "Beneficial use necessarily varies with the humidity of seasons." WIEL, supra note 39, at
507. "Different seasons require a different quantity of water. Different crops require different quantities
of water." Sears v. Orchards Water Co., 236 P. 502, 505 (Or. 1925).
66 David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies, 18 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 19, 21-22 (2003).
67 For example, a 1918 decree recognizes an appropriation date of March 16, 1892 and a rate
of flow of 4.0 cubic feet per second for irrigation use on 300 acres, not to exceed 900 acre-feet of water




change from a seasonal use to a year-round use, such as from agricultural to
municipal water use, would greatly increase the total quantity of water diverted,
though the flow would remain constant.
68
Around the time that water rights became codified, many states held
general statewide adjudications of water rights to place quantity limits on pre-
code rights that were issued without a water decree. 69 The task was not to
change the nature of the rights to quantity-measured, but merely to determine
how much water each use implied. All in all, the process of adjudication was
rather piecemeal. Today, some water certificates contain just a maximum flow,
some include restrictions on the timing of intakes, and some include a
maximum water duty, 0 or various combinations thereof. However, the
quantification is still secondary to the use itself; one cannot have a right to
more water than is necessary or has been actually put to beneficial use. The
quantity limitations merely provide a concrete description of the amounts of
water implied by the use that is the subject of the right. Recording quantity
measures can be very useful in determining the boundaries of rights at a glance
and are necessary for accomplishing transfers to prevent third party harm. Yet,
these quantities remain subject to amendment upon proof of a pattern of
historical use that does not match the written description. Though recent
improvements in technology and changes in water regulation have resulted in
more frequent and accurate measurement of water consumption, these
measurements still lack authority across changes in use.
71
For the most part, right-holders are allowed to vary their intakes within
some "reasonable" range as is necessary to accomplish their particular
purposes. 72 The policing of water use remains relatively lax and day-to-day
regulation operates mostly on a loose honor system, 73 though there is a
68 See, e.g., City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1968).
69 The Colorado Act of 1881 provided for the adjudication of water rights. Justice Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act: Settling In, 3 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 1, 6 (1999). A second round of adjudications in western states occurred in the 1970s and 80s, and
litigation continues today. See John E. Thorson, et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams (pt. II), 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 299, 303-04 (2006).
70 A water duty is the amount of water used per acre for irrigation.
71 Both Oregon and Colorado have taken significant steps toward complete quantification of
water rights. However, even these states still define the water right "as a beneficial use capped by a
maximum rate and duty, rather than a rate and duty capped by beneficial use." Krista Koehl, Partial
Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises Traditional Principles to Achieve Flexibility, 28
ENVTL. L. 1137, 1150 (1998).
72 Foster v. Foster, 213 P. 895, 897 (Or. 1923) ("Appropriators of water with old established
rights dating back to a settlement in the early seventies should be allowed a reasonable latitude for a
change of cultivation of the land and rotation of crops, in order that the more remunerative products may
be raised .. "). "Farmers ... will continue to treat their water rights as if the amount of water is highly
flexible as long as they are using the water beneficially to themselves and as long as, on an overall
average basis, they believe they are operating within the limits of their paper rights." Neuman, supra
note 4, at 977.
73 Interview with Howard Wertsbaugh, Dist. Hydrologist, U.S. Dep't of the Interior: Bureau
of Land Mgmt., in Caion City, Colo. (Aug. 8, 2005); Neuman, supra note 1, at 467-68; Neuman, supra
note 4, at 986.
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growing trend for states to require the measurement of intake on head-gates.
However, watermasters typically only respond to complaints and do not
directly police diversion. 74 They also spend much of their time negotiating
deals to satisfy all parties involved and to produce the best result for the
community. Watermasters do not behave as if they were strictly enforcing
clearly defined rights.
Written quantity decrees also do not prevent future appropriation of water.
If the water is physically available, then it may be appropriated and put to a
beneficial use. It is irrelevant that, according to issued water decrees, all of the
water in the stream is held by right. The quantities listed in the decrees are not
the true measure of the rights; the physical use, the amount of water applied
outside of the natural course of the stream, is the authoritative measure.
Therefore, streams can be "overappropriated" on paper, and are
overappropriated in many watersheds in the western states.75
Overappropriation, as a rule and not an exception, is only rational if the water
certificates are supposed to be a limit on, or description of, the water right and
not a substantive measure of the right itself.76 The uses fit together in a
comprehensive web that allots water to its rightful owners, which are not
necessarily the quantities written in the paper certificates.
Quantity measures are temporarily authoritative to make certain changes,
such as a change in the type of use or point of diversion, that are often
associated with transfer of ownership. Quantity becomes the dominant measure
of the right for these purposes so that the prior appropriation system can allow
for continuity of rights across changes of use that would otherwise destroy a
use-measured right. The quantity measure of the water right creates a limited
and temporary exclusionary regime, a sphere within which the right-holder is
free to make some choices regarding the application of the right.77 As long as
the new use falls within the quantity limits of the latest decree for that right,
then it is a legitimate exercise of the right. As Demsetz's theory predicts, the
temporary definitions of water rights for purposes of transfer have become
74 See Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in
the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881, 890-95 (1998)
(describing passive enforcement). Watermasters are state officials responsible for coordinating and
policing water rights.
75 Some rivers with average flows of a few thousand cubic feet per second ("cfs") have
recorded total appropriations of one million cfs. John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and
Water Rights, SK056 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 283, 305 (2005).
76 Overappropriation is not inconsistent with quantity-measured rights, but merely means that
the junior rights will rarely "kick in." However, the fact that so many streams are overappropriated
suggests that there is a better explanation and that, by totaling the maximum limits on all the more senior
rights and subtracting them from the amount of water available, these junior rights actually yield more
water than one would expect.
77 The same process is apparent in changes of use that merely expand the amount of acreage
under irrigation. This change is sufficient to destroy the underlying use-measured right (the right to




more definite as demand increases and the cost of measurement falls.
7 8
However, because the quantity decrees are not the permanent measure.of the
right and every transfer requires re-quantification under the historical use
doctrine, legal obstacles thwart the advantages of efficient evolution of right
definition.
79
Historical use refers to the "true right" in a water decree-that is, the
portion of the water decree that has ripened through application to beneficial
use. Today, historical use refers both to an amount of diversion as well as an
amount of return flow, the difference between which is assumed to be the
amount of consumptive use. With every transfer, the amount of historical use is
reassessed either by the state water agency, or in Colorado, by a water court.
8 0
Over a number of transfers, this process inevitably reduces the amount of water
over which a right extends because the assessments will never increase, but
rather, further limit the quantity of the right. Historical use assessments are
necessary because paper rights often do not reflect actual patterns of use.
Therefore, third parties may rightfully rely on water that has been historically
left instream, even though that water may on paper be granted to a senior user.
"[A]n appropriator cannot change the point of diversion or the place of use if
the change increases the historical use to the detriment of other
appropriators."
81
Before water was as scarce and valuable a commodity as it is today, the
amount of water encompassed by a right in the process of transfer was not
scrutinized very closely. The court or bureaucrat's investigation might only go
so far as to determine that the use was the same before and after the transfer. A
1995 report showed that out of 919 transfers prior to 1969, none had volumetric
limits, 814 had no flow rate limit, 906 had no seasonal limits, and 810 had
neither flow rate nor seasonal limits.82 The reason such a system was workable
at all is because most of these transfers were from one agricultural use to
another, and therefore did not imply significant changes in patterns or volume
of use. Many states have statutory provisions granting farmers the presumption
that they are acting within the limits of their water rights, where the farmers
78 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967) ("[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become
larger than the costs of internalization.").
79 See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo. 1999);
Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732, 737 (Wash. 1997); Neuman, supra
note 4, at 960; Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988).
80 See MacDonnell, supra note 55, at 492-93.
81 Danielson v. Kerbs Agr., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 373 (Colo. 1982). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37-92-305(9) (West 1989); Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Colo, 1980);
City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1968); Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo. 1954).
82 See James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challenge for Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1998).
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merely change the type of crop without expanding the number of irrigated
83acres.
Aside from the transaction costs, the historical use requirement for
transfer also has a chilling effect on trades because right-holders risk partial
forfeiture of the water right with every attempt to transfer. 84 Today, with
increasing diversity in water use, the burden of proof is much higher and is a
significant transaction cost, arguably the primary reason that water markets
have not fared better. The burden of proof rests on the right-holder to show that
historical use is not less than the amount written in the water decree, while the
court is likely to impose further quantity limitations, such as a required return
flow or augmentation to ensure that third parties are not harmed by the trade. 85
Losses may result not only from actual decline in historical use, but also from
inaccuracies in the measurement process which, even with modem technology,
remains imprecise. 86
D. The Advantages of Quantity Measures
The application of both quantity and use measures to appropriative water
rights resulted in a system that, at the time of its inception, captured the most
beneficial aspects of both regimes. Use measures were advantageous for
determining the first-time allocation of water rights because use-measured
rights promoted maximum utilization by ensuring that water would not be
unused when there was demand. 87 Any instance of non-use forfeited the water
to the next in priority who would put it to beneficial use. Use-based allocation
of water rights was also egalitarian and anti-speculative, 88 consistent with the
83 DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES,,DEP'T OF NAT RESOURCES, STATE OF COLORADO,
GUIDE TO COLORADO WELL PERMITS, WATER RIGHTS, AND WATER ADMINISTRATION (2006), available
at http://www.water.state.co.us/pubs/wellpermitguide.pdf.
84 "Inadequate analysis of historical utilization or ambiguity in the law as to how that
historical use should be measured can lead to uncertainty and confusion in the administration of the
transfer system." Corbridge, supra note 82, at 504. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-305(3), -
502(2) (West 1989); Farmer's Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799,
815 (Colo. 2001) (stating that a change of water right risks re-quantification based on actual historic
consumptive use); Pueblo West Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 717 P.2d
955, 959 (Colo. 1986).
85 See, e.g., Danielson v. Kerbs, Ag., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 373 (Colo. 1982); C. Carter Ruml,
The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Rights, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169, 176-77 (2005)
("If harm is shown, the transfer wil be either blocked outright, or, more frequently, approved subject to
modifications so that return flow appropriators will not be harmed.").
86 See Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketing Western Water: Can a Process Based
Geographic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 330-31
(2001).
87 Arguably, the Homestead Act is an example of an inefficient allocation of resources based
on a standard quantity measure, because 160 acres of land may be insufficient for subsistence in certain
arid regions of the west.
88 "Prior appropriation is egalitarian, equitable, and efficient in that: (1) beneficial uses are
recognized without regard to the economic value which will be produced therefrom ... ; (2) access to
the available supply is based on need for a beneficial purpose; and (3) no more water belongs to the
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Lockean justification for property rights and with republican ideals: "As much
as any one can make use of to any advantage of life.., so much he may by his
labor fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and
belongs to others .... ,,89 Every person had an equal right to obtain sufficient
water to mine or irrigate his land, given the limitations of first in time, first in
right, but could not appropriate more than necessary for his use. The
appropriator must leave unused water instream, where it can be appropriated
and put to use by others.
The problem with use-measured rights is that they are also rigid and
resistant to change, freezing the initial allocation of rights in place. As values of
water use changed, the allocation of water rights became increasingly
inefficient. A method of transfer was necessary for economic pressures to
funnel water into more valuable uses. Under the current regime, there is also
little incentive for holders of use-measured rights to invest in new, water-saving
technologies because conserved water is simply forfeited.
Quantity-measured rights tend to be the most workable for the
reallocation, i.e., transfer, of rights. Quantities account for the exclusionary
nature of tangible resources, like water, which cannot be used for more than
one purpose at any given time, and do not admit overlap, at least in theory, the
way use-measured rights often do. A primary advantage of quantification is that
the number of units to which a property right applies remains constant, thereby
making questions about the distinction between one owner's rights and
another's predictable and relatively easy to determine. Of course, water is
unique from other physical resources because rights to water are typically
divided into usufructs, such that different users across space and time may have
rights to the same physical molecules. Yet space and time are also quantifiable
and can be accommodated into the quantity measure of a right. Quantity also
allows for greater exercise of dominion by the right-holder to choose how to
put his water to use, creating a sphere of authority in which markets can
develop.
In sum, quantity measures are best at maintaining efficiency over time in
changing circumstances, though not sufficient for addressing the problem of
initial allocation. An arbitrary initial allocation of some fixed quantity of water
is unlikely to reach an efficient solution through markets because water
markets, even in the most ideal circumstances, include inherent sources of
failure. There are significant transaction costs associated with water transfers,
including the cost of measurement and transport. During the formation of the
doctrine of prior appropriation, these costs were arguably so great as to be
prohibitive, and remain severe limitations on water markets today. Allocation
water right than the amount reasonably necessary under the circumstances to effectuate the use." Hobbs,
supra note 2, at 25.
89 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 31 (1690), reprinted in
RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 197 (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek eds., 1923).
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based solely on efficiency also fails to address distributive justice concerns.
9
0
Those who are initially able to obtain the largest water rights reap the benefits
of future trades to more beneficial uses.
Prior appropriation incorporates the best of both systems by utilizing use
measures to define and allocate water rights, and by implementing a quantity
measure for the purposes of transfer. 9 1 The outcome was not perfect, but
withstood over 150 years of application. Yet now that water rights are virtually
entirely allocated, even in years of well-above-average precipitation, we are
free to ask-why not do away with the remainder of this use-based system?
The remnants of use measures in water rights only serve to inhibit greater
efficiency of water use and incentivize wasteful behavior.
IV. The Composition of Instream Water Rights
Before discussing the incompatibility of privately held instream rights
with the current hybrid water rights regime in the West, I provide a brief
history of states' efforts to protect instream flows. Many of these efforts
support the proposition that private instream rights would be both successful
and desirable, while highlighting the problems with awkwardly positioning
these new types of rights within the framework of the current regime. I then
defend my claim that complete quantification of water rights is the best and
only way to achieve fully-fledged instream rights, as well as functioning water
markets for both instream and consumptive rights, while pointing out some of
the obstacles to such a significant change in the current water law.
A. A Brief History of the Protection of Instream Flows in the West
Water law in the West faces a dual task of accommodating changing
values of uses for water, as well as addressing increasing scarcity that puts
additional stress on an already fully loaded system. Traditional water law is
resistant to the accommodation of instream uses because at the time that prior
appropriation was formulated, the water left instream was considered a waste of
a valuable resource. The water allocation system was built on the premise that
90 The western settlers' sense of distributive justice seemed to require that each man be
allowed enough water to irrigate his land when so doing would not infringe on others' ability to irrigate.
"Law and equity give first locator of land and claimant of water sufficient quantity of water to irrigate
his land." Gilcrest v. Bowen, 24 P.2d 141, 146 (Mont. 1933); see also Schorr, supra note 5.
91
The objective of the water law system is to guarantee security, assure reliability, and cultivate
flexibility in the public and private use of this scarce and valuable resource. Security resides in
the system's ability to identify and obtain protection for the right of water use. Reliability
springs from the system's assurance that the right of water use will continue to be recognized
and enforced over time. Flexibility emanates from the fact that the right of water use can be
changed, subject to quantification of the appropriation's historic beneficial consumptive use and
prevention of injury to other water rights.
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo. 2001).
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water in its natural channel is unused, and therefore open access. The Colorado
Supreme Court stated in 1965 that "instream flow 'is a riparian right and is
completely inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation.' ' 92 Not only
must instream uses be recognized as beneficial, but the diversion requirement
must be amended, and ultimately, the very way in which water rights are
measured must be reassessed.
93
The existing methods of instream flow ("ISF") protection in the West
range from government regulation to private ownership. For private instream
rights to fit into the prior appropriation system, the purpose for which the water
is appropriated or transferred must be recognized as a beneficial use. Many
states now recognize ecological preservation, fisheries, or recreation as
beneficial uses, but states vary as to which or any of these three are
legitimate. 94 Most instream beneficial uses came to be recognized through
government programs designed to protect fisheries or river ecology. 95 Once the
state legislature recognizes a use as a beneficial government purpose, courts are
likely to uphold the use when carried out by private entities absent any specific
statutes to the contrary. However, most states explicitly reserve instream water
holdings to particular government agencies and will not apply property
protections to instream flow rights (ISFs) held by private entities. 96 State water
law also often includes a hierarchy of uses, and activities such as recreation are
usually low on this list. Because most ISFs are controlled by government
entities, they are subject to these legislative and judicially created hierarchies.
The second modification that states have made in an attempt to
accommodate ISFs is to alter the diversion requirement. Some states have
92 Hobbs, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d 798, 800 (Colo. 1965)).
93 "The main obstacles to market transfers of water instream are.., the legal impediments
that states enact-like constraints on ownership and transfer-not the nature of water itself." George A.
Kimbrell, Private Instream Rights: Western Water Oasis or Mirage? An Examination of the Legal and
Practical Impediments to Private Instream Rights in Alaska, 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 75,
83-84 (2004).
94 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming all recognize at least one instream use
as a beneficial use. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 51, at 9 tbl. 3.
95 Some examples: In Utah, the Division of Wildlife Resources may convert consumptive
water rights to instream flow for the propagation of fish, public recreation, and reasonable preservation
or enhancement of that natural stream environment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(1 1)(a) (West 1953). The
Washington Department of Ecology may establish minimum flows for protecting fish, game, birds, other
wildlife, or recreation or aesthetic values in the public interest. See Jack Sterne, Instream Rights &
Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 207
(1997). The Idaho Water Resources Board may appropriate water for fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic
life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, navigation, transportation, or water quality. Id. at 209.
96 "[I]nstream flow rights held by private individuals or organizations are often perceived as
constraints to future water development. As a consequence ... most western state legislatures have
authorized only governmental agencies to hold in-place water rights under programs that balance
competing instream and consumptive uses." Steven J. Shupe & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Recognizing
the Value of ln-Place Uses of Water in the West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, 1-1, 1-9, 1-10 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice
eds., 1993).
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adopted special statutes that bypass the diversion requirement specifically for
ISFs; other states have simply recognized that diversion is not always required
to maintain a water right. 97 Some states have also enacted particular exceptions
for specific purposes, such as Colorado's Recreational In-Channel Diversions
(RICDs) statute, under which municipalities may appropriate water instream
for recreational purposes, allowing the construction of artificial features, such
as those in a whitewater park, to satisfy the diversion requirement.
98
The majority of ISF protection powers are restricted to government
entities. 99 Roughly speaking, the protections can take two forms: that of a
regulation, or that of a government held property right. Examples of regulations
that protect ISFs include statutory minimum flows, the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act,100 and the public trust doctrine. These limit other valid water rights and
thereby protect water instream. Minimum flow statutes were some of the first
efforts by states to maintain water instream, and the first ones were enacted in
Oregon in 1955 and Washington in 1967.101 These statutes prohibit the
withdrawal of water below specified flows and require review of new
appropriations.
States and the federal government can also reserve water. Reservations
remove the water from the common pool so that it may not be appropriated, but
typically the reservation must be for a specific public purpose. In other
instances, state or local governments are authorized to appropriate water for
instream uses. Most western states have enacted legislation that allow only
particular government agencies to hold instream water rights for the purposes
97 Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming all have special statutes that make an exception for ISFs from the diversion
rule. Arizona and Nevada are states in which diversion is not always required. South Dakota is silent on
the issue, but in practice has allowed, though not promoted, a few protected ISFs. COLO. WATER
CONSERVATION BD., supra note 51, at 8.
98 The recognition of manmade whitewater features as sufficient to satisfy the diversion
requirement was first made by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1992. City of Thornton v. City of Fort
Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 930-31 (Colo. 1992) (stating that appropriation of water must be by "a structure
or device which either removes water away from its natural course or location and towards another
course or location or which controls water within its natural watercourse."). The court decision was
followed by legislative action to restrict the instream appropriations to only that much water as was
necessary for a "reasonable" recreation experience, that is, "the experience in and on the water that
would allow individuals with suitable skills and abilities relating to the specific recreational activity for
which the water right is being sought, to partake in that activity." 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3 (2001).
This statutory language was a response to concerns that "under Ft. Collins, appropriators could obtain
high recreational in-channel flows, severely hindering Colorado's future development." Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 599 (Colo. 2005).
99 Political opposition to privately held instream rights is largely based on fear that instream
rights will harm current consumptive rights by reducing return flows, fear that instream rights will
hamper future economic growth and development, and a belief that water should be used on the land.
Sterne, supra note 95, at 222-26. For example, both the Oregon Farm Bureau and the Cattleman's
Association opposed the activities of the Oregon Water Trust in transferring consumptive water rights to
instream uses. Tarlock, Future of Prior Appropriation, supra note 34, at 781.
100 Hobbs, supra note 2, at 24; Kimbrell, supra note 93, at 76.
101 Salmon are a likely reason why the Pacific Northwest is at the forefront of ISF protection.




of environmental protection or protection of fisheries and other recreational
interests. 02 The Colorado Water Conservation Board, established in 1973 by
the Colorado Water Right Determination Act, is one such agency with funding
to acquire water. 103 Agencies may either appropriate available water or
purchase existing rights and convert them to ISFs.
Recently, more flexible and creative methods have been approved to
supplement these agencies' holdings, such as the amendments to the Colorado
Water Right Determination Act that allow private individuals to donate rights
to the CWCB or loan them for up to 120 days.' 4 However, the success of such
agencies has been limited, and the failings are often attributed to lack of
funding and the ambivalent role that these agencies play in representing
conflicting interests. 105 The inadequacy of govemment agencies has increased
the demand for privately held instream rights that could harness the power of
private resources to achieve a more optimal level of ISF protection.
Two states, Alaska and Arizona, explicitly allow private entities and
individuals to hold instream rights.' 0 6 Notably, as of 2002 less than a dozen of
these rights have been granted in Arizona and none in Alaska. 107 Upon closer
inspection, the ISF rights in these states are really second-class rights and are
not equivalent to other traditional water rights. 108 In Alaska, instream rights are
subject to review every ten years, and may be revoked at virtually any time if
required by other water needs. 109 Watermasters are also not required to enforce
the rights on the same basis as diversionary rights. Furthermore, there are
significant transaction costs to proving the quantity of water necessary to
achieve the intended purpose, such as protection of fisheries, which requires
years of measurement and data compilation." l0 Because Alaska is not an arid
state and instream flows have not been seriously impacted in the vast majority
of watersheds, private entities have little incentive to invest the significant
amount of capital necessary to obtain a right that could evaporate at any
102 Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming allow specific state agencies to acquire
water rights to protect fish, wildlife, and sometimes recreation. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD.,
supra note 51, at 10 tbl. 5, 13.
103 Colorado Water Right Determination Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1973).
104 H.R. 03-1320, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-105(2)(a) (2004)); Wells, supra note 4, at 361.
105 Kimbrell, supra note 93, at 80-81; Wells, supra note 4, at 310, 35 1.
106 Instream Flow Act of 1980, ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 93.141-47 (2002); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-152 (2003); In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River System and Source (Gila II), 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999).
107 In Alaska there were 237 applications for instream flow rights from 1980-2002, but only 8
by private parties, none of which were granted. Kimbrell, supra note 93, at 89.
108 "[l]nstream rights that have been created lack legal 'equivalency' with appropriative
rights because they generally operate outside the traditional water rights system or as a cumbersome and
ill-fitting addition to it." Sterne, supra note 95, at 206.
109 Id. at 228-30.
110 Arizona requires one year of on-site streamflow measurement once per month to be
granted an initial permit and an additional four years to perfect the right. Id. at 226.
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moment. The rights are also non-transferable and may not be converted to any
other use.
In Arizona, the story is slightly different, likely because of the
significantly more arid climate, and therefore, the increased value of water.
Privately held instream rights were initially created judicially, and the
appropriation process for instream rights is controlled by agency regulations. 11
However, the rights are expensive to acquire because they also require many
years of data collection and analysis. In spite of the disincentives to invest, the
Nature Conservancy obtained the first privately held instream right in Arizona
in 1990, and went on to acquire nine others. 112 However, the further expansion
of instream right holdings is limited because they may only be acquired by
appropriation and not by transfer. Because virtually all of the water in Arizona
was appropriated by 1919 and Arizona does not allow the transfer of
consumptive rights to instream uses," 3 only a negligible amount of water is
eligible for appropriation as instream rights.
Oregon and Washington are also pioneers in instream rights, and have
managed a more effective incorporation of instream rights into their water law
systems, though they do not allow fully-fledged, privately-held instream rights.
Both allow private entities to acquire water for instream uses, but require the
right to then be turned over to a state agency to be held in trust on behalf of the
citizens of the state.' 14 Holding the rights in trust prevents the state from selling
the rights, a condition often also included in the contract negotiated between
the right-holder and the trust. The inalienability thus achieved is desirable to
the individuals that donate such rights for environmental protection purposes.
However, the system is too static to accommodate instream uses that might be
beneficial only in the short term, 115 and also does not accommodate other types
of instream uses such as recreation.
Other states have also taken steps to harness private resources for
preservation of ISFs. Montana and Oregon allow for temporary leases of water
to private individuals or entities to promote fisheries." 6 California allows an
111 See McClellan v. Jantzen, 547 P.2d 494, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Resources, 118 P.3d 1110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
112 Sterne, supra note 95, at 227; COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 51, at 31.
113 Sterne, supra note 95, at 227.
114 Id. at 208-09 n.46, 213; Wells, supra note 4, at 336, 341; Mary Ann King, Getting Our
Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 495 (2004). Recently, the Oregon
Water Trust made a successful attempt to hold the permanent acquisition of water in its own name. The
resulting instream right was called a "flow augmentation" right by the courts. Id. at 518.
115 This problem is true of other types of conservative easements. See Julia D. Mahoney,
Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 749 (2002).
116 Temporary means up to ten years. If the water is "salvaged water" that was made
available by water saving methods such as improved irrigation methods or the lining of ditches, then
leases may be extended for up to thirty years. Wells, supra note 4, at 323, 329. In 1994, the Bonneville
Power Administration entered a lease with agricultural users for 150 cfs on the Snake River and 68.4 cfs
on the Malheur River. In 2003, 215 leases for water were to be used instream: one-third made by the
Oregon Water Trust, one-third made by the Deschutes Resource Conservancy, and one-third by the
Water Resources Department. Neuman, supra note 1, at 442.
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existing user to devote water rights to instream environmental uses, but not to
appropriate for that purpose. However, because there are also statutorily
required minimum streamflows in California, there is a tendency for the rights
merely to be absorbed with no noticeable effect on the level of the flow. 
117
Water trusts are institutions that promote private purchase of water rights
to convert to ISFs and have been successful in many states. 1 8 Trusts are a
means to consolidate available resources; they also often act as brokers to
facilitate deals and lower the costs associated with these types of
transactions.1 19 The trusts allow individuals interested in preserving instream
flows to contribute to a fund, without necessarily committing the full cost to
purchase the amount of water necessary to achieve their desired purpose, such
as preservation of instream flow for fish, etc. The Oregon Water Trust is a
particularly successful example, consisting of over 84 projects protecting a total
of 117 cubic feet per second ("cfs") instream. 120 The Trust also engages in
creative methods to obtain water rights, offering to fund water saving
improvements to irrigation infrastructure in exchange for one quarter of the
quantity of water saved thereby. The development of water trusts is evidence
that individuals are willing to pay for the conservation of instrearn flows,
121
and that privately held rights might function effectively in a water market.
Though enjoyment of water instream is typically non-excludable and therefore
a type of public good, the tendency for underinvestment would not necessarily
be prohibitive to the success of private right-holders. 122
Striking differences in protections or prohibitions of ISFs exist across the
states, depending on whether they are created through appropriation or transfer
from other uses. Many states allow one and not the other as a means for
government agencies or private entities to acquire water for ISFs. 123 There are
legitimate problems with both methods. Appropriation of water for ISFs can
lock up entire watersheds and effectively prevent any further appropriation or
117 See Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for
California, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. EVNTL. L. & POL'Y 23, 32 (1996). This is another problem that
could be avoided by quantification of instream rights to be held in addition to that amount of water
already in the natural channel.
118 Examples of water trusts include the Oregon Water Trust established in 1993, the
Montana Water Trust established in 1998, the Washington Water Trust established in 1998, the
Colorado Water Trust established in 2002, and the Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program
established in 2002. Janet Neuman et al., Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's Instream Flow
Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1150-53 (2006); King, supra note 114.
119 King, supra note 114, at 518.
120 Sterne, supra note 95, at 221-22; Oregon Water Trust, Projects, available at
http://www.owt.org/projects.html. One hundred and seventeen cfs is not a great deal of volume, but can
be significant to maintaining healthy ecosystems in small channels.
121 See Sterne, supra note 95; Wells, supra note 4, at 343-44.
122 For one possible solution to the public good problem, see David D. Haddock, Irrelevant
Internalities, Irrelevant Externalities, and Irrelevant Anxieties (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 03-16, 2003), available at http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/lep/art27.
123 For example, Arizona only allows the state to transfer existing consumptive rights to
instream uses, though private entities may only hold instream rights acquired through appropriation.
COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 51, at 14 tbl. 10.
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upstream use. 124 Though efficiency arguments favor transfer to obtain water for
ISFs, there are consequences to moving agricultural water off of the land, and
these consequences create political resistance.' 
25
Overall, the existing methods of instream flow protection are piecemeal
and far from optimally efficient with respect to other types of water uses, and
with respect to the high value that many citizens would place on maintaining
more water instream. 126 Though the system of property rights might be
expected to adapt to account for these changing values in resource use, a great
deal of inertia must be overcome, not only in the form of political opposition,
but also in the very structure of water rights as a property regime. Only by
quantifying water rights, at least with respect to instream rights if not all water
rights, can efficiency be achieved in balancing the value of both diversionary
and instream water use.
B. The Failures of the Hybrid Regime
Instream rights cannot be satisfactorily defined by the existing hybrid
composition of water rights because the uses are novel and non-diversionary.
Instream uses are not easily quantifiable, typically require large amounts of
water, and by definition resist diversion as a convenient proxy to quantify the
right. Because non-diversionary uses cannot avail themselves of this
measurement proxy and therefore cannot easily shift from a use-measured to
quantity-measured right, they cannot effectively function as hybrid rights. In
effect, instream water rights can only be use-measured or quantity-measured,
not both.
Instream uses differ from traditional uses for water in several significant
respects. First, the purposes for which water might be left instream are
generally not easily quantifiable. Unlike determining the amount of water
necessary to irrigate thirty acres of alfalfa, the amount of water necessary to
maintain a healthy trout fishery is a difficult scientific question, much less the
amount of water necessary to satisfy aesthetic purposes. The quantity will vary
widely depending on the size of the stream in question and other ecological
factors. The uncertainty of the quantity of water encompassed by these types of
uses results in risk of forfeiture by judicial or bureaucratic review under the
doctrine of waste. Courts would also have more difficulty identifying
speculative purchases or appropriation of water, which is a source of much of
the political resistance to privately held instream rights. 127
124 See infra Section IV.B.
125 See supra note 96.
126 "The money is there to lease and purchase water rights for instream purposes, but
mandatory state ownership or trust status . . . limits the willingness of many consumptive users to
participate." Jesse A. Boyd, Hip Deep: A Survey of State Instream Flow Law From the Rocky Mountains




Secondly, instream uses tend to require a relatively large amount of water,
particularly in larger streams and river channels. As a result, an appropriation
with the purpose of protecting a fishery or for recreational purposes may
completely block upstream development. 128 Though a perfect market might
dissolve such concerns, most states do not allow transfer from instream to
consumptive uses, and vice versa, because of third party effects. If the value of
instream uses cannot be compared to the value of consumption, the opportunity
cost of keeping water instream versus diverting water is not considered, and the
rights are isolated from market pressures. Though appropriation for a
consumptive use has the same effect of "freezing" upstream uses into place,
there are more possibilities for negotiation and contractual readjustment such
that multiple uses may be satisfied. Because "instream flow rights held by
private individuals or organizations are often perceived as constraints to future
water development," interest groups prefer such rights to be held by
government entities, subject to political pressure. 29
Another problem with rights issued for uses that require relatively large
amounts of water is that such amounts are difficult to obtain. Because hybrid
rights are essentially use based, rights for amounts of water less than that
necessary to support a fishery or recreational use will ultimately forfeit. The
only available option for obtaining these amounts is through appropriation,
either because of state prohibitions on transfer from out-of-stream to instream
use, or because of the lack of functioning water markets. However, almost all
of the water in the West has been appropriated. The only possibility for
instream appropriations is very high in the mountains, upstream of most users
with prior rights. Otherwise, the appropriation will have virtually no effect on
the water flow because of lack of priority, but will merely serve to block any
future appropriation. 30
128 In the Senate Hearings leading up to S.B. 216 (allowing RICDs), Mike Shimmin testified
that high volume instream appropriations may "effectively tie[] up the entire unappropriated flow of that
stream. It will effectively prevent the construction of junior upstream storage projects." Hearing on S.B.
216 (Colo. 2001), quoted in Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 600 (Colo. 2005). The town of Gunnison, Colorado, sought to
appropriate 270 to 1500 cfs for recreational use, depending on the season, approximately 157,000 acre-
feet annually. This represents about 41% of the average annual flow on the Gunnison River Colo. Water
Conservation Bd., 109 P.3d at 585.
129 Steven J. Shupe & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Recognizing the Value ofln-Place Uses of
Water in the West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
IN THE WEST, at 1-9 to 1-10 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
130 An example is the Recreational in Channel Diversions (RICDs) in Colorado, by which
municipalities may appropriate water to guarantee minimum flows for recreational purposes, namely
whitewater parks used by boaters. Buena Vista and Salida both applied for RICDs on the Arkansas
River, which requests were denied because the water would be unavailable except during the spring
floods even in a year of above average snowpack. The native water of the Arkansas River was fully
appropriated by 1884, and year round flows in the river are only possible due to water imported from the
Western Slope, which is unavailable for appropriation. John Gierard et al., Executive Summary, in USDi
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. ET AL., ARKANSAS RIVER WATER NEEDS ASSESSMENT § I-I (Roy E. Smith &
Linda M. Hill eds., 2000).
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The characteristic of instream uses that most inhibits accommodation by
existing water law is lack of diversion. Diversion is required for non-
consumptive uses in most western states because diversion is a means of notice,
measurement, and establishment of exclusive use. 13 1 In combination, these
functions allow for the transition from use to quantity-measured rights that is at
the heart of the hybrid system.
Removal of water from the stream notifies others of one's intent to
appropriate and how that appropriation will impact other right-holders.
132
Establishment of a water right has been analogized to the capture of wild
horses-an individual may not claim ownership without first establishing
control. 133 Diversion is also the means by which quantity limitations are
imposed on the right. Headgates are a convenient means of measuring water
flow, either by controlling the flow to a certain fraction of the ditch's capacity
or by installing a floatmeter or other measurement device into the gate itself.
The only examples of legitimate water use that did not require diversion before
use were consumptive uses in which the water was directly removed from the
stream. Other proxies were then employed for measurement purposes. For
example, water used to raise cattle but not diverted from the stream prior to
consumption was measured in heads of cattle. Today, water that is applied
directly from the stream, such as for domestic purposes to water a lawn or
garden, must be measured by some device.
Finally, diversion establishes exclusivity of use and a certain degree of
separation or disentanglement of water rights necessary for quantification and
transfer. In the early days of prior appropriation, when diversion was the entire
measure of water rights, diversion was an easy means by which to make the
transition from use to quantity-measured rights. This function has been
somewhat eroded by the consideration of return flows, or of other changes in
the stream condition which recognize the interdependency of water uses.
However, the amount diverted for a use-based right is a low-cost translation of
use measure to quantity measure for the purpose of transfers. But where a shift
between types of measurement is not reasonably possible, as is the case with
non-diversionary uses of water, transaction costs may be an insurmountable
obstacle to transfers. In such a situation, a hybrid system simply will not
function.
As a result, any established instream rights are effectively locked in place.
The difficulty of converting an instream right back into a consumptive or
diversionary right, because others come to rely on the water downstream,
131 See supra Section III.B.
132 Some of the literature suggests that the days of diversion as a means of notice are over,
due to the permitting system adopted in all of the Western states except Colorado and "modem
communication." Boyd, supra note 126, at 1210. 1 would disagree and argue that diversion remains an
important means of actual notice to this day.
133 J. CRAIG GREEN, INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, USE IT OR LOSE IT: COLORADO'S OLDEST
AND BEST RECYCLING PROGRAM (2002), available at http://www.i2i.org/articles/3-2002.pdf.
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prevents transfers away from the instream use. Furthermore, because there is no
positive activity that demonstrates the right-holder's instream use of the water,
there is essentially no applicable doctrine of forfeiture. The rigidity has several
potential effects on privately held instream rights. First, private entities may
underinvest, since purchasing instream rights is basically a sunk cost with little
possibility for a future sale. Second, state governments will tend to put special
restrictions on such rights because doctrinal checks to deter efficiency, such as
forfeiture or waste, do not apply. State governments are also more likely to
reserve the authority to hold such rights to a government entity acting in the
"public interest" rather than to a private group, on the justification that such an
entity is in a better position to weigh the opportunity costs and broader
implications of the use of water instream, rather than consumptively. And
finally, states may put restrictions on whether consumptive rights may be
transferred instream, because of the concern that rights, once converted to
instream uses, are permanently removed from diversionary or consumptive
uses.
In sum, diversion allows a hybrid compositional regime for appropriative
water rights to work. The functions of diversion explain much of the difficulty
with instream rights that are not simply attributible to skepticism toward the
validity of these new uses. Without a modification of the compositional regime,
instream rights cannot be fully and efficiently incorporated into western water
law.
C. Quantification of Instream Rights
Eliminating the hybrid compositional regime and establishing a unified
quantity-measured system of rights could overcome many of the difficulties
faced by privately held instream rights. I am not attempting within the scope of
this Article to make the case that instream rights should be privatized as
opposed to government owned or regulated. There are valid concerns about the
commodification of water and legitimate questions as to whether water use,
instream or otherwise, should be controlled by a private property system.' 34 I
am making the more modest claim that if states are interested in legalizing
privately held instream rights, then they must be quantified. 135 The definite and
134 A common argument against private ownership of instream flows is that "instream flows
are uniquely public in character, reflecting collective decisions." Wells, supra note 4, at 366-67. On the
other hand, it might be argued that "constraint on ownership of instream rights is directly opposed to one
of the basic principles of prior appropriation: water should be available to anyone who puts it to
'beneficial use' without waste." Kimbrell, supra note 93, at 77. Furthermore, many of the objections to
the quantification of water rights are based on a concern that it may lead to increased scrutiny of
consumptive rights, and thereby reveal waste and illegal use resulting in the loss of rights by many
consumptive users. Sterne, supra note 95, at 226. These are not efficiency concerns, but concerns about
redistribution.
135 Frank Trelease states:
An ideal water law should give a water right those characteristics that will encourage and enable
people to make the best decisions as to water use in their own interest and hence ultimately in the
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distinct boundaries of rights provided by quantification would reduce
uncertainty regarding rightful ownership and lower transaction costs by
facilitating beneficial transfers of all types of water rights. For instream rights,
transfer of location of use is only possible by quantification. Though water
markets are likely to include unavoidable sources of market failure, there are
theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that privately held instream rights
would be successful players in markets and would contribute to optimization of
water use.
Complete quantification of water rights must include not only the quantity
of diversion, the location (such that a change in location of diversion
downstream might deduct some flow due to evaporation or seepage, etc.), the
amount consumptively used if any, and the amount of return flow. The timing
of the flows must also be specified both on a yearly basis, and possibly daily or
hourly. Lastly, both a maximum flow of water and a total acre-feet amount
must be included in the quantification for full definition. A non-consumptive
but diversionary right would include an amount to be diverted and an amount to
be returned, deducting for inevitable losses from in-channel flow. An instream
use would include a measurement at a given "starting point" of the right and a
quantity at the "end point," which incorporates deductions for loss from
seepage, evaporation, or transpiration while flowing in the natural channel. In
other words, a quantified instream right would be a right to a certain quantity of
water over a length of natural channel, subtracting for natural losses as the
water travels across that distance. Though the costs of accurately policing these
rights might initially be high, at least in theory, water rights could be
distributed in distinct and identifiable packages.
Measuring instream rights purely in quantity terms would include doing
away with the beneficial use requirement necessary to vest a water right, and
transfers would not be limited to the historical use of the right-holder. Instead,
each water decree granting the owner the right to use would include the definite
and permanent quantification of the right. The owner has the right to transfer
and use the full amount; users who rely on water left unused by the right-holder
do so at their own risk and such use cannot establish a claim of right. For
example, a change in use that falls within the limits of the quantity terms, but
that injures a junior right-holder, would be a valid exercise of the senior right-
holder's authority. The doctrine of forfeiture might be modified to function in
the quantity-measured water rights system analogously to adverse possession of
public interest. Private uses of water should be based upon property rights not dissimilar to the
property rights in more stable and tangible assets ....
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 45
(2002) (quoting Frank J. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and
Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 8-9 (1965)).
In general, for privatization "property rights must be clearly defined, defended against outside incursion
and made divisible." Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., The Value of Private Water Rights: From a Legal and
Economic Perspective, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 313, 336-37 (2004).
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real property. 136 Hostile and open use of the water by others for a period of
time might result in forfeiture of the right to the new user. By this means,
absent or uninterested owners of water rights, including instream rights, whose
behavior implies that their water use is inefficient might be divested of their
rights.
Though use was a convenient means by which early miners and settlers
initially allocated water for consumptive uses, the same does not hold true for
instream uses. As previously discussed, appropriation of water for instream
uses typically involves a great deal of water that is not necessarily available and
merely serves to block future upstream development. These difficulties can be
avoided by only allowing water for instream rights to be obtained through
transfer rather than appropriation. Such a rule would provide some protection
against speculators or rent seekers, who may wish to obtain a "blocking" right
as a bargaining chip against future potential users.
Quantification of water rights, both instream and traditional, would
facilitate transfers by lowering transaction costs and lowering the cost of
detecting right infringement. Abolishing the historical use measure of water
rights, and substituting a fixed quantity measure that may only be amended
through voluntary sale or forfeiture akin to adverse possession, would also
reduce many of the risks and costs of transfer. Eliminating the necessity of re-
quantifying rights would greatly reduce the cost of measuring and re-measuring
the same right over time. Owners would also avoid the risk of partial loss
through requantification by the court or state water agency. By ensuring that
the full measure of the right may be transferred, both buyers and sellers will
have better knowledge about the bundle of rights for which they are bargaining.
The increased definiteness of boundaries and homogeneity also facilitates
accurate valuation of rights. 137 If instream rights actively compete with other
types of water uses, market forces will ensure that only relatively efficient
instream uses will be maintained, and will limit the need for regulatory and
judicial efficiency oversight through the doctrines of waste and forfeiture.
Some states have taken steps to achieve complete quantification by
eliminating circumstances in which rights must be requantified, making the
quantity definition more robust. Oregon has already eliminated the historical
136 Adverse possession with regard to water rights was abolished in 1939, likely because it
caused more confusion and dispossession of rightly acquired rights than it did transfer rights to more
efficient users. The doctrine of adverse possession presupposes a system of definitive private property
rights such that open and hostile use is possible. If there is uncertainty about the boundaries of rights,
then there will be inherent uncertainty as to the hostility and openness of any attempt at adverse
possession. A quantitative system of water rights could be sufficiently definitive for the doctrine to be
sensibly applied. G. Oliver Melgar, Sewage Effluent Happens: But Who Has the Right to Its Beneficial
Use?, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 587, 588 (2004).
137 There are several accepted water valuation techniques: sales comparison; income
capitalization or farm-crop budget analysis, which estimates the revenues that agricultural users would
forgo; land value differential, which compares the value of land with or without appurtenant rights; and
development-cost approach, which considers the price competitive users would be willing to pay to
develop new water supplies in lieu of those that had been sold. See Wells, supra note 4, at 376-77.
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use measure of rights and adopted a paper right measure in its place. 138 In
1994, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 869 to increase right-holders'
flexibility in water use. In a letter to the Oregon Water Resource Commission,
the Attorney General interpreted the Bill to state that "as long as a user has a
facility capable [of] handling the full allowed rate and duty, and is otherwise
ready, willing and able to make full use of the right, using less water to
accomplish the beneficial use allowed by the right does not subject the right to
forfeiture for nonuse."' 139 Therefore, right-holders no longer face the burden of
proof in showing historical use of the full quantity of water as stated in the
paper right. Though transferors are still burdened with proof of "no injury" to
junior users, 14 the removal of the necessity to provide evidence of historical
use dissolves a large evidentiary obstacle. 141 Judicial language in Colorado also
hints at a movement toward doing away with the historical use measure by
applying the doctrine of res judicata to questions regarding the historical
quantity of a water right where that right has been previously adjudicated. 1
42
However, as of today, the res judicata defense can be overcome by evidence of
change in conditions and therefore is not robust against changes in use by the
right-holder.
Complete quantification of water rights has been shown to facilitate
markets in actual practice, as illustrated by the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District (NCWCD). In Colorado, water diverted from its natural
watershed is foreign water not subject to the doctrine of beneficial use and the
no injury rule. 143 The Big Thompson Project diverts approximately 230,000
acre-feet of water from the Western to the Eastern slope of the Rockies every
year to supply the NCWCD. Individual users own shares of the Colorado Big
Thompson Project ("CBT") water, which are contractual agreements between
the water district that owns the CBT rights and the individual water users. CBT
shares are fully quantified both with respect to total acre feet, rate of diversion,
138 See OR. REV. STAT. § 540.610(3) (1997); Koehl, supra note 71; Neuman, supra note 1, at
472.
139 Letter from Stephen E.A. Sanders, Assistant Attorney Gen., Or. Dep't of Justice, to
Comm'n Members, Or. Water Res. Comm'n (Feb. 15, 1994) (DOJ File No. 690-001-NRO02-94), quoted
in Koehl, supra note 71; Hearing on S.B. 869 Before the Senate Water & Land Use Comm., 69th Leg.
(Or. 1997) (statement of Martha Page!, Director, Oregon Water Resources Department.
140 Water is unusual in that transfers are subject to consideration of third party impacts. The
transfer of other types of resources typically leaves negative third party effects uncompensated. Thomas
J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy: Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 165, 168 (1998). The unique treatment of water transfers may arise both from
water's history of communal ownership as well as the difficulty of the current definition of water rights
to internalize third party impacts. These two factors are linked: The tradition of communal ownership is
related to the difficulties ofprivatizing the resource.
141 In opposition to removing the historical use standard, Krista Koehl argues that S.B. 869
will reduce efficient reallocation of water by blocking forfeiture. Koehl, supra note 71. 1 take the
opposite stance, that by solidifying the boundaries of rights, more efficient transfers will occur through
market processes than would have otherwise occurred through regulatory forfeiture of rights. See
discussion, supra note 71.
142 See Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1997).
143 See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation, 926 P.2d 1, 70 (Colo. 1996).
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and seasonal duration. Shares of CBT are more highly valued than even senior
native rights because they are robust and well-defined property rights and have
a reliable market value. 144 Therefore, an investment in a share of CBT is not a
sunk cost. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the CBT shares makes them much
easier to value, which decreases uncertainty in the investment. As a result, the
NCWCD is considered to be one of the most developed water markets in the
nation, and, on average, about thirty percent of its shares move through the
rental market each year.1
45
There is no reason to believe that instream rights could not also participate
in the CBT market, barring the current legal obstructions to such an
experiment. Shares of instream CBT water could be purchased to ensure a
quantity of flow in addition to that which was otherwise already instream. The
consumptive rights to the same water could then be sold to users downstream.
Water markets that do not include a centralized right-holder, like the NCWCD,
which contracts with and guarantees water delivery to individual users, would
probably incur larger transaction costs and have more difficulty in instituting a
successful water market. The shift from hybrid to purely quantity-measured
rights is only one step, though a significant step, towards facilitating such
transfers. These transfers in turn promote the feasibility of privately held
instream rights.
Obtaining instream flows through voluntary transfer rather than
government regulation also aligns economic incentives with the public interest.
There is growing opinion in the West that more water left instream for
recreational, environmental, and aesthetic purposes would increase the general
welfare. Government regulation is a popular proposal to achieve this end, and
was the first type of instrearn flow protection implemented in the form of
mandatory minimum flows. A more recent proposal is the "physical solution,"
which makes explicit that only the use of water, and not any particular quantity
of water, is protected by a water right. The "solution" requires users to apply
water more efficiently, by protecting only that amount of water that is strictly
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the right was issued. Restricting
the amount of water protected under each use would free up water that could be
left instream. 1
46
144 For example, in April of 2000, CBT shares sold for about $26,000 per acre-foot while
native rights sold for about $1,000 per acre-foot. This price difference is also attributable to the fact that
CBT water is backed by storage to insure against a dry year. Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney,
Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept Along By the Current or Choosing a Better Line?, 6 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 411, 422 (2003).
145 See Carey & Sunding, supra note 3, at 288.
146 MacDonnell, supra note 55, at 514-24.
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However, coercive regulation inevitably fosters resistance, 147  and
regulation is perceived as particularly egregious when it appears to constitute a
taking by the government without any compensation to the right-holders. The
enforcement of such regulations have given rise to deep-rooted feelings of
injustice, such as those arising out of the battle in the Klamath River Basin in
148California in 2001. This type of conflict not only sinks unnecessary dollars
in litigation costs, but does not lay a foundation for future cooperation. As an
alternative, free-market environmentalists suggest that individuals be paid for
their rights to be used in a way that is beneficial to the environment and the
public interest. 149 Much has been written on this topic. 150 The literature
supports the theory that more efficient levels of conservation may be achieved
when aligned with market incentives, rather than through the exercise of
coercive governmental powers.151
In sum, the facilitation of transfers by quantification of water rights would
promote privately held instream rights through the possibility for mutual
welfare gains. 152 The effectiveness of water trusts is evidence of the
willingness of private individuals and private entities to purchase rights for the
purposes of maintaining instream flows. These types of non-profit
organizations can provide the social risk capital that the state may not otherwise
be able to provide. 153 Interest groups can bargain with water right-holders
directly instead of attempting to influence instream flows through roundabout
means such as government agencies 54 or lobbying of the legislature. But like
the government, private entities such as the Nature Conservancy or Trout
Unlimited can, at least partially, overcome the underinvestment problem of
147 See Graft& Yardas, supra note 140. There is a tension between increasing scarcity that
gives rise to government regulation to promote efficient use of water, and respect for vested property
rights. "[T]he curtain is opening on the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that
doctrine can be integrated into the law of vested rights." Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo.
1968).
148 See Hayes, supra note 66, at 24.
149 1 am assuming that entitlements shall be taken as they are. There may also be distributive
justice concerns with respect to initial entitlements, creating resistance to a change in the water rights
system such as the one I propose here, that would both confirm these initial entitlements and add to their
value.
150 See, e.g.,King, supranote 114, at511.
151 Markets may not always be optimal in making water use decisions; for example, the
protection of habitat for anadromous fish may pose a special collective action problem that justifies
government intervention because these fish require continuous minimum flows over many miles from
the ocean upstream to their breeding grounds. However, with functioning markets in place, the
government may focus its resources on those situations in which there are reasons to suspect market
failure.
152 See Wells, supra note 4, at 343.
153 See King, supra note 114, at 518-19.
154 For example the whitewater rafting outfitters on the Arkansas River in Colorado work
closely with Colorado State Parks, which purchases additional water for late summer flows in exchange
for a 0.25% water tax on the purchase price of each rafting trip. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION
BOARD, STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE § 4.9.2 (2007).
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public goods by pooling resources to produce efficient investment choices.155
One would expect alliances of recreational and environmental interests because
of the non-consumptive character of instream flows that allow the preferences
of many individuals to be satisfied simultaneously. There is also no reason to
believe that all interests must be captured to achieve an efficient result. Optimal
benefit to the majority of individuals may be obtainable by a few individuals'
willingness to pay. 156
On the other side of the transaction, right-holders such as farmers have
many reasons why they might be willing to sell or lease their rights for instream
uses. 157 Leasing is a particularly flexible means by which farmers might give
up rights in the short term based on yearly weather patterns or crop rotation. 
158
Right-holders will be much more likely to participate in such transfers if they
do not risk loss or forfeiture of their rights because the measure of their rights
are fully quantified and therefore are robust.
Viable water markets would also take into account the competing interests
within the context of instream flows. More water instream is not necessarily
better for all types of instream uses. Therefore, the opportunity cost of the
consumption of the water is measured not only against instream and non-
consumptive uses, but also, the opportunity cost of foregoing alternative flow
levels. For example, the health of certain fisheries are optimized within a
narrow range of water flows. 159 Too little water leads to grave problems for
fish, such as lack of feeding surface area and warmer temperatures, but high
flows are also unhealthy to fish populations. In strong currents, fish must
expend much more energy and smaller fish may die. There are also fewer
feeding areas during higher flows, further limiting the calorie intake and
therefore growth of fish. On the other hand, whitewater rafting outfitters prefer
higher flows. Higher water results in better photos, more T-shirts sales, and
increased likelihood that clients will return. On the Arkansas River for
155 The opposite concern is that non-profit entities like these may have an "unfair" or
inefficient advantage over other taxable private interests, which would result in too much water being
held instream.
156 See Haddock, supra note 122.
157 Reasons to sell might include instability in the agricultural market, farm debt, and other
considerations that are relevant to the interests of particular right-holders. Graff & Yardas, supra note
140, at 167.
158 There are two types of instream leases: the split-season lease, in which a portion is used
for irrigation and a portion is left instream during critical seasonal periods for fish and other wildlife,
and the dry-year lease. Dry-year leases come in several forms: (1) the insurance lease, in which one
party agrees not to use the water in a dry year, (2) the option lease, in which the lessee provides
additional payment for the exercise of the right to use in a dry year, and (3) the predictive lease, in which
!he lessor forgoes irrigation for the number of years that on average it would have been necessary to
satisfy both uses. Leases can also come in short and long term forms. Wells, supra note 4, at 321-23.
There are also a variety of creative means by which instream rights may be acquired in a free market
system, such as that employed by Montana Trout Unlimited, who paid for the removal of a diversion
dam in exchange for six months of instream flow. Id.
159 See Clay Bridges et al., Natural Resource Assessment, in ARKANSAS RIVER WATER
NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 130, §§ 5-11 to 5-16.
Yale Journal on Regulation
example, anglers prefer a flow between 200-500 cfs, while rafting outfitters
prefer a flow of about 2,000 cfs. 160 Because the Arkansas River is undammed
and uncontrolled for over one hundred miles from its headwaters to the plains,
anglers and rafters cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In a market context, the
two interest groups could bid against each other to obtain the highest value use,
or compromise and work out an agreement by which each is benefited and
welfare is maximized.
Quantification also allows for rights to be divided into more efficient sizes
or bundles of rights. The right to consumptive use may be split from the right to
instream flows. Some types of instream uses, such as the protection of
anadromous fish or navigation, may require an instream right that applies from
the headwaters to the ocean. However, the same water could also be held under
an instream right upstream and a consumptive right downstream. Quantified
rights may be split into smaller units without risking forfeiture where that
amount is less than the full requirement for a specific use. Eliminating the
beneficial use requirement obviates the onerous process of demonstrating the
amount of water necessary for a given use. Without the necessity of purchasing
all the required water in one transaction, the purchaser can acquire as much
water as is available and hold these rights while searching for other water rights
to fulfill the purpose that the owner has in mind. The role of government
agencies or courts in regulating water use would be replaced (at least partially)
by market forces. If water was not put to a beneficial use, the market forces
would push towards sale and application of those rights to a more valuable use.
In general, instream rights would be greatly promoted if governments did not
inquire into particular uses of water as a prerequisite for property protection.
D. Obstacles Facing the Solution of Quantification
There are three problems, two practical and one political, with
quantification as a solution to the obstacles faced by privately held instream
rights. First is the free-rider problem: Inherent characteristics of water may
result in market failure that leads to underinvestment in instream uses.
Secondly, the technology of measuring and quantifying water rights may not be
sufficiently developed to provide, at a reasonable cost, the level of accuracy
necessary for full quantification of instream rights without proxies such as use.
And lastly, ranchers and farmers are politically resistant to any type of
amendment to the water rights regime that might promote transfer of water
rights off of the land.
The problem with market forces replacing use measures as safeguards
against waste and non-use of water is the possibility of market failure, though
state governments that wish to encourage successful water markets may take
160 See Bruce DiGennaro & Dave Taliaferro, Recreation Assessment, in ARKANSAS RIVER
WATER NEEDS ASSESSMENT, supra note 130, §§ 6-31, 6-40.
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steps to mitigate these difficulties. Instream uses present a potential free-rider
problem because the benefits of increased instream flows are non-exclusive.
However, because there is no prisoners' dilemma in that coordinated action of
all interested parties is not necessary to achieve optimal results, the free-rider
problem may not be a significant obstacle.
For example, a group of angling outfitters might get together to purchase
water rights instream to protect their local trout fishery. However, other
outfitters are not blocked from entering the market, nor are outfitters who
already exist in the locality blocked from refusing to pay, and free-riding on the
investment of the others. Associations that require membership for certain
exclusionary benefits might be able to circumvent the free-rider problem to
some extent, but the threat of "cheating" will remain. Direct regulation of
access to water that flows in a natural channel is often very difficult, due to the
public's protected interest in navigation. The simplest solution is to purchase
the land that provides access to the waterway to obtain a method for exclusion,
but streams and rivers tend to have many points of access and often are located
on public land. Another means of exclusion is by the issuance of permits by
govemment agencies, which would limit the number of individuals or entities
allowed to use the water and therefore encourage bargaining among the
permitted users.
Governmental coercive power can also be implemented to solve the free-
rider problem in other ways. One possibility is to require taxes or permit fees
for use of the waterways that is then put towards the purchase of instream
water. Though government agencies would then make the choices regarding the
amount of rights purchased for instream flows, the agency would merely be a
participant in the market, albeit a privileged one. Another option would be to
utilize something akin to a Business Improvement District, such that a majority
of individuals in an area, such as riverfront landowners, could opt to form a
"Water Purchase District" in which contribution towards the cost of instream
flow augmentation would be mandatory. Or, in a more court-centric approach,
individuals who benefit from water instream could be held liable for a share of
the cost of the water right. For example, the angling outfitter who free-rides off
the purchase of rights by other outfitters would be liable to them for an equal
proportion of the cost of the water purchased, as determined by the court.
However, whether free-riding would result in suboptimal outcomes in the
context of instream water rights is an entirely empirical question, because a
small group of persons with a relatively high willingness to pay could render
irrelevant the free-riding behavior of others, by footing the bill in its entirety. 161
In some sense, those who benefit from the protected instream flows but who
did not contribute to the purchase price may receive a windfall. Even so,
because more water instream is not always better, the optimal level of instream
flows can be achieved without capturing all consumer surplus. Therefore,
161 See Haddock, supra note 122.
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whether or not free-riding is actually an obstacle to efficiency is entirely
dependent upon the particular context.
Another potential problem with water markets is the separation of the
non-consumptive and consumptive elements of a water right. Once rights are
split and sold separately, transaction costs may prevent reassembly. If so, rights
will tend to remain in less-than-efficient-sized bundles.'1 62 In the case of water
rights, imagine that instream rights are sold upstream while the right to divert
and consume the water is sold downstream. If an upstream consumptive user
wants to purchase the right, transaction costs may prevent him from doing so,
even where his use is more valuable than that of the instream and consumptive
uses combined. The ratchet effect in favor of instream rights may actually
offset the free-rider problem mentioned above. However, both are sources of
potential market failure that could produce inefficient water usage. One
solution to the fragmentation problem would be to prohibit the breakdown of
water rights in this manner.' 63 Rules preventing fragmentation are commonly
applied to real property, restricting the types of estates that owners can carve
out of the original. 164 Instead, individual contracts that include some reasonable
end point must be negotiated. The same approach could be used to prevent
water right fragmentation.
The second major obstacle to the quantification of water rights in general
and to the policing of instream rights in particular is technology. Water rights
began in the early settlement of the West as intangible rights, in part because
water was so difficult to track and measure. The capture rule is a means to
avoid the measurement problem, but capture is not the only means to provide
notice of ownership. 165 A registry of quantified water rights combined with
regular stream measurements could provide constructive and actual notice to
others of the amounts claimed by private owners, without requiring removal
from the stream.
Installing gauges at regular intervals to measure instream flows would be
necessary to acquire the requisite data. With stream flow measurements,
instream right-holders might police their rights and determine infringement by
a junior consumptive user. In most western states diversions must be measured,
so that the amount of water legally diverted from the stream is already known
and available. The most difficult task is to determine the escape of water
through uncontrolled means such as seepage, evaporation, and uptake by
vegetation. Hydrologists are in the process of developing computer programs
162 See Heller, Boundaries of Private Property, supra note 30, at 1174-75.
163 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28.
164 See Heller, Boundaries of Private Property, supra note 30, at 1168-74, 1201 ("Anti-
fragmentation mechanisms respond to predictable bargaining failures that lead owners to waste jointly
controlled resources."); see also Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of
the Future, 88 VA. L. REv. 739, 749 (2002).
165 In contrast to the wild horse analogy previously mentioned, I suggest an analogy to




that might be linked up with the Geographic Information System, to address the
"spatial and temporal interconnections of the hydraulic system" to produce
comprehensive models by which water flow may be tracked and the impact of
changes in use or transfer of location of use predicted. 1
66
An advanced measurement technology or modeling system is necessary
for water markets to function seamlessly and without burdensome review
processes for determining otherwise unaccounted-for third-party harms.
However, an imperfect model might provide the basis for an agreement on
definitive property boundaries. 167 An imperfect but authoritative method of
quantification could still provide many of the benefits already described. As
water rights are able to be quantified more definitively, transaction costs will
continue to decrease.
Infrastructure necessary for water delivery is another technological
obstacle to water markets and instream flows. Delivery is an additional
transaction cost that prevents uses of water from competing with one another
over larger geographical distances. In sum, water markets are likely to always
suffer from technological imperfections that result in market friction.
In spite of the seemingly obvious efficiency advantages of a use-based
system, a significant number of water rights-holders and others with related
economic interests are politically resistant to any change in the existing regime
that will encourage water transfers. Many rural irrigators regard municipalities
as a menace and believe that Los Angeles will manage to acquire all of the
West's water to maintain its golf courses. 68 The transfer of water away from
agriculture does give rise to legitimate concerns. It would ultimately lead to the
end of a western way of life that has been in place for generations, as land from
which the water rights have been sold would be left fallow to revert to its
natural desert state. The small communities that rely on agriculture for an
economic base would dry up and disappear. Because ranchers and farmers
often resist all transfer of water off of the land, this includes use of water for
instream flows. But if quantification could produce healthy water markets, high
prices for water rights produced by competitive bidders seem likely to
166 Matthews et al., supra note 86, at 331. The Hydrological-Institutional Model is used to
predict how much water will pass through Colorado to Kansas for the purposes of the Arkansas River
Compact, taking into account rain, snow, well pumping of groundwater, evaporation, canal seepage,
trans-mountain imports, and reservoir storage. The model has the potential to under or over predict the
amount of water by up to 22%. Yet the system seems to be satisfactory as a basis for determining the
respective rights and duties of each party. See Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 99-101 (2004).
167 See Matthews et al., supra note 86.
168 Whether or not cities are actually able to obtain more than an efficient amount of water
through the political process is an open question, but there is a common perception that they can.
Markets could remove the pressure point from legislative action to private transactions and provide
greater legitimacy to the process. On the other hand, market transfers may prove just as contentious. See
Gary D. Libecap, Chinatown: Owens Valley and Western Water Reallocation-Getting the Record
Straight and What it Means for Water Markets, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2005) (arguing that the farmers
in Owens Valley were fairly compensated for the agricultural value of their land, and the water transfers
produced overall gains of trade, in spite of the common perception that Owens Valley was a disastrous
abuse of political power by the City of Los Angeles).
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overcome the social norms that currently prevent right-holders from selling.
Though resistance to change in the water regime may be an initial obstacle for
quantification, it is not a threat to the long term viability of a quantified water
rights regime.
V. Conclusion
The identification of western water rights as essentially use-measured
rights highlights two important issues to current water policy. First, use
measures are an inherent obstacle to the incorporation of privately held
instream rights into the system of western water law and second, the use
measure of water rights is a reason that even traditional diversionary water
rights have resisted successful marketing. The early definition of western water
rights incorporated the benefits of both use-measured and quantity-measured
property regimes, producing a hybrid system that accommodated the two
necessary functions of the property regime of water in the West: the initial
allocation of water, and the reallocation and transfer of water once the rights
had been granted and established. However, the values and principles behind
these two functions remain in tension with one another. Today, with the
virtually complete allocation of western water rights, we might ask whether the
use measure is justifiable when divorced from the function of allocation. If
states are interested in incorporating privately held instream water rights as a
means to instream flow protection and preservation, then the answer must be
no. For privately held instream rights to be a reality and not an illusion as they
are now, quantification is a necessity.
The choice between use and quantity-measured rights, and the
implications of such choices, is certainly not limited to water. Private property
rights in many resources might benefit from measure in use. Fugitive resources
in particular are often costly to measure in quantity terms such that a use
measure proxy is an efficient means to define the property right. Use measures
are particularly justifiable when faced with the task of allocating private
property rights from a common pool. Such situations are not uncommon-new
technologies, such as the radio spectrum and internet domain names, continue
to reveal or produce valuable but limited resources. If allocation schemes based
on use are adopted for these new resources, or for other common pool resources
such as fisheries or clean air, we might expect analogous challenges and
difficulties to those faced by the law of western water. Our choice in the
compositional component of property rights should be made with those lessons
in mind.
Pure use measures are effective when applied to resources for which use is
non-exclusive, or resources for which change in use is either impossible or
undesirable, so that the problem of transfer need not be addressed. The ability
of use-measured rights to interlock and overlap can maximize productive use of
the resource. Once a maximizing placement of rights is achieved, the nature of
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the rights themselves resist change and inefficient fragmentation. However, for
most resources, the relative value of various uses rarely remains static, so
allowing for transfers of rights is beneficial. One option is the hybrid system of
rights adopted by western water law. The system can both reap the advantages
of use measures in initial allocation, responding to concerns of equity and
efficiency, and retain the flexibility to adapt to shifts in optimal patterns of use.
Hybrid rights function well where uses are closely correlated with specific
quantities; oftentimes, the requirement of removal from the common pool can
serve to make clear the quantity to which a use right refers.
Yet the story of western water rights illustrates the inefficiencies of hybrid
rights, particularly when the resource is fully allocated and new uses depend on
transfer from existing entitlements. Hybrid rights are also unworkable when
uses of resources do not easily identify with a specific quantity, as is often the
case with "conservative" uses: those uses that inherently do not involve
removal from the common pool because removal would defeat the very
purpose of the use. Some examples of conservative uses include leaving water
instream, leaving a domain name "unused," leaving a radio frequency blank, or
leaving a fish to live and reproduce in the ocean.169 Many of these conservative
uses are potentially valuable, so that market efficiency would require that
underlying property rights accommodate such uses. The solution is to measure
these resources in quantities, so that resources can be left in the common pool
and used non-consumptively while maintaining a claim of ownership. As
technologies evolve and measurement costs decrease, quantification is more
and more likely to be the most efficient means to define property rights in
common pool resources that mix consumptive and non-consumptive uses. With
quantification, the law does not require an individual to capture to own, or to
remove to claim, because there can be property without possession.
169 Yandle and Morriss mention the possibility of owning live whales through the
development of GPS and DNA fingerprinting techniques, though under traditional whale appropriation
customs, the only way to claim ownership of a whale was by killing it. Ownership of a live whale in the
ocean is an example of a "conservative use" right. Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The
Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 128-29 (2001).

